

The Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Romania, 1955-1958

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In the late 1940s and 1950s the Romanian Communist leaders gradually gained the Soviets' trust as dependable partners in international communism and demonstrated their ability to control their country. The Soviet Union came to consider Romania a reliable friendly communist state, especially following Yugoslavia's formal expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 and the relocation of its headquarters from Belgrade to Bucharest. In the summer of 1955, following the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty and a relaxation in the East-West tensions, the Romanian communist leadership broached the issue of the removal of all Soviet troops stationed in Romania since 1944. In Bucharest's view these troops no longer were needed to secure the communication lines with Austria (which became independent as a neutral state and the foreign troops pulled out by fall of 1955).

The Kremlin initially balked at the proposal, but the events of 1956 in Hungary demonstrated that Moscow could rely on Bucharest to maintain order and a communist system, issues of primary importance to the Soviet leadership. After a series of diplomatic exchanges, in July 1958 the Soviets withdrew their military forces. This paper, based on published documentary and secondary sources, will analyze the Soviet motives for the final military withdrawal and the extent of the Romanian effort toward that realization.

As one may surmise, there is debate over the reasons for the Soviet decision to withdraw military forces from Romania. In *The Balkans: from Constantinople to Communism*, Dennis P. Hupchick asserts that, in the midst of the October-November 1956 Hungarian revolution, Romania provided Prime Minister Imre Nagy "temporary refuge after he was ousted from Hungary." Consequently, opines Hupchick, the Romanian Communists embarked into lengthy negotiations with the Soviets regarding "the removal of all Soviet troops stationed in Romania because they no longer were needed to safeguard communications with Soviet forces in Austria." These negotiations culminated in 1958 with the withdrawal of the garrisons "in exchange for the Romanians handing Nagy over to the Soviets for execution."¹ This assertion implies that Bucharest had full control of Nagy and his group and a quid pro quo existed between the pullout of Soviet troops and Nagy's transfer to Hungary. The fact is that after Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, "the Soviet KGB

lured Imre Nagy and other members of the Hungarian revolutionary cabinet from their asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy² on 22 November and brought them to Romania, although not in the Romanian government's sole custody.³

In his introduction to a published collection of documents on the Soviet withdrawal, University of Bucharest professor Ioan Scurtu takes issue from a patriotic viewpoint with contemporary Western and Eastern accounts which disregard the Romanian communist leadership's role in influencing the Soviet decision and the hope this action presented to the peoples in Eastern Europe.⁴ Yet, the newly declassified documents support the claim that the Kremlin was motivated in this action by economic and political considerations: the need to cut military spending and the desire to win the propaganda campaign in the Cold War and demonstrate the aggressive posture of the "imperialist camp." Although Scurtu refers to these Soviet goals, he contends that the Romanian achievement should have been given its deserved credit and placed in its proper historical context.⁵ Of course, one should look at the Kremlin's motives to have Soviet troops still stationed in Romania as late as the summer of 1958, 14 years after their entrance during the closing days of World War II.

As the Red Army liberated the Soviet Union from Axis forces, it crossed the Soviet frontier and occupied or freed Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, parts of Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. This Soviet intervention led to the establishment of a buffer zone in Eastern Europe ostensibly to forestall any future Western aggression against the Soviet Union. This Soviet domination generally followed a fairly effective pattern: the Red Army occupation; formation of a coalition government with other parties in which the Communists held key government posts, in particular the ministry of the interior that controlled the police; intimidation and use of force by the police (if necessary assisted by the Red Army) against political opposition; and finally, expulsion of non-Communists from the government. Consequently, all of Eastern Europe fell under Soviet political and military control. Since Yugoslavia became Communist on its own and demonstrated a modicum of obedience to Josif V. D. Stalin, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, it escaped Soviet military occupation and maintained some measure of independence. The rest of Eastern Europe was firmly under the Soviet iron heel. Most of these governments enjoyed small support from the population at large (as the momentous changes of 1989-1991 demonstrated). Bilateral military agreements concluded between Moscow and the Communist governments of Eastern Europe enabled a Soviet military presence well after the end of the Second World War.⁶

The legal basis for the Soviet military presence on Romanian territory until May 1955 was the Allied Powers' Treaty of Peace with Romania of 10 February 1947. Article 21 section 1 of the treaty stipulates that

Upon the coming into force of the present treaty, all Allied Forces shall, within a period of 90 days, be withdrawn from Romania, subject to the right of the Soviet Union to keep on Romanian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria.⁷

However, the shortest route from the Soviet Union to Austria does not pass through Romania as the two countries do not have contiguous borders. In addition to the 1947 peace treaty, in December 1948 the Soviet Union and Romania concluded a series of bilateral accords regulating the technical and logistical aspects of the presence of Soviet troops on Romanian territory.⁸

The international legal status regarding this military presence on Romanian territory remained unaltered until the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May 1955 which bestowed independence and neutrality on Austria, but also provided for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from its territory.⁹ Accordingly, on 25 October 1955 the last of the military units of occupation were withdrawn, ending the regime of occupation in Austria.¹⁰ As a consequence of this treaty, the presence of Soviet forces in Romania no longer had legal justification.

According to Gheorghe Apostol,¹¹ at the time first secretary of the Romanian Workers' Party¹² (RWP), and scholars such as Ioan Scurtu, the Austrian State Treaty motivated Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, at the time the prime minister, to initiate feelers regarding the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Romania.¹³ Subsequent developments indicate that Minister of Defense Emil Bodnăraș had been designated as go-between the RWP leadership and the Kremlin on the matter of Soviet military withdrawal. Gheorghiu-Dej delegated Bodnăraș in this task because of his past services to the Soviet Union, his favorable reputation among the Soviet leaders, his government position (he was one of the three vice-premiers), and his thorough knowledge of the Russian language.¹⁴

Apostol's explanation that the Austrian State Treaty served as catalyst for Romanian government's feelers, however, disregards the significance of another international treaty, which preceded it. This is the Treaty

of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, or the Warsaw Pact, concluded on 14 May 1955. There were two reasons given for the pact's necessity. First, the new situation in Europe created by the ratification of the Paris agreements, which provided for the formation of a new military alliance, the "Western European Union," and second, a remilitarized Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These developments, according to the treaty's preamble, increased "the danger of another war" and presented "a threat to the national security of the peaceable states."¹⁵ At the same time, the formation of a legally defined, multilateral alliance legitimized Soviet Union's domination and influence in Eastern Europe and partly rationalized Soviet military presence in Hungary and Romania for an indefinite period of time. Moreover, as a formal organization, the Warsaw Pact provided the Soviet Union an official counterweight to NATO in East-West diplomacy. As stated in Article 9, the treaty was open to other states, irrespective of their social or political regime, who declared themselves willing to adhere to the terms and principles of the treaty. The agreement was binding for twenty years, unless an all-European system of collective security should be established, in which case it would cease to be in force.

Furthermore, by Article 5, the signatories agreed to set up a joint command of their armed forces to take measures necessary for strengthening their defense capacity in order to safeguard their achievement, to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and to provide safeguards against possible aggression. Article 6 revealed the treaty's political character, stipulating that for the purpose of holding consultations under the treaty, the signatories were to establish a political consultative committee, while Article 7 forbade them from entering into any coalitions, unions, or agreements contrary to the terms of the treaty.

In spite of the restrictive provisions of the Warsaw Pact, Bucharest embarked on its move to get the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Romania. According to the memoirs¹⁶ of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, it was Bodnăraş who, as minister of defense, first raised the question of the presence of Soviet troops in Romania during the Soviet leader's visit to Bucharest in August 1955. In light of the recently published Romanian documents, Khrushchev's conclusion that the RWP leadership had already discussed the matter and Bodnăraş was no doubt chosen to introduce the subject proved accurate.¹⁷ Khrushchev records that Bodnăraş justified the subject by pointing out that there was little threat to Soviet security interests because Romania "shares borders only

with other Socialist countries and there's nobody across the Black Sea from us except the Turks."¹⁸ As Dennis Deletant writes, Khrushchev could not act on the suggestion in 1955 "but the idea of withdrawal had been planted in his mind and he used it at the time he regarded most appropriate."¹⁹ In the end, we can argue that this only helped the Soviet leadership increase its confidence in the Romanian Communists' preparedness in taking over the responsibilities, a point which Bodnăraş made to Khrushchev.²⁰

A short time later, with the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution on 7 November 1955, the Romanians sent to Moscow a high level delegation headed by Emil Bodnăraş. According to some accounts, following a Kremlin reception, Khrushchev and Nikolai A. Bulganin, president of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., had a private conversation with Bodnăraş during which they informed him that "we have decided to withdraw the Soviet troops from Romania. This decision was taken not because you have raised the issue, but because we consider it necessary."²¹ That is, Khrushchev insisted that it was the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government and not the Romanian communists to perceive the necessity of such action. Needless to say, this resolution was well received in Bucharest; however, the existing international situation in late 1955 was not conducive to such an undertaking as more time was required before it could be implemented. As Khrushchev recorded, Stalin's crimes have not been exposed yet,²² and the Soviets had to do more work toward their "new look."

In the meantime, the Soviets embarked on a worldwide campaign ostensibly to improve the international situation, in fact to enhance the U.S.S.R.'s image in the world. Khrushchev was convinced that in the "peaceful competition" between the socialist and capitalist camps, socialism would emerge victorious as the model for the peace-loving peoples everywhere. In this spirit, meeting for the first time on 28 January 1956, the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact submitted the offer of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty states;²³ this offer was ignored by the West, as were other similar future proposals.

Furthermore, in this effort of improving its image, the new Soviet leadership denounced the Stalin cult of personality during the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. Khrushchev declared himself in favor of replacing the violent methods practiced by Stalin with political talks and consultations.²⁴ His "secret speech" signaled the beginning of a de-Stalinization process in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, a process which differed from country to country.

A major step in the direction of the dismantling of the Stalinist structure was taken in early spring. On 18 April 1956 the Central Committees of the member parties²⁵ which participated in the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform) announced the dissolution of this organization founded in September 1947 (to organize the exchange of experience and to coordinate the activities of communist parties). The declared reason for this act was that it had completed its function, recognizing that "there have been changes in recent years in the international situation" which "have provided new conditions for the activities of the Communist and Workers' Parties."²⁶ The Cominform had been a Stalinist vestige and a tool of the Kremlin in imposing communist unity. Its dissolution therefore was an effort to bolster the new image of a Soviet Union in pursuit of a peaceful policy in international affairs inaugurated earlier the preceding year: its acceptance of Austria's independence (May 1955) and its rapprochement with Yugoslavia (June 1955). But the Cominform's dissolution did not mean the beginning of a new era, since Moscow would in no way allow a weakening of links between Communist parties, as the events in Eastern Europe would demonstrate in the fall.

De-Stalinization meant a loosening of repressive measures and excessive controls, it did not mean freedom from Soviet domination or neutrality in the Cold War for the buffer states bordering the Soviet Union. In neighboring Hungary, the Communist government of Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced in late October 1956 the reintroduction of a multi party electoral system, declared the country's neutrality, and the decision that it would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. To the Kremlin these measures threatened the stability of the Socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact and sent military forces to suppress the "counterrevolution."²⁷

During the critical days of the Hungarian revolution Moscow released a lengthy declaration on 30 October 1956 expressing its commitment to peaceful and friendly cooperation with the socialist states. In the interest of guaranteeing the mutual security of the socialist countries, the Soviet government expressed its willingness to discuss with the Warsaw Pact members the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of these countries. In this the Soviet government proceeded from the general principle that the stationing of troops of one Warsaw Pact member on the territory of another member state "should take place on the basis of an agreement among all its participants and not only with the agreement of the state on whose territory these troops are stationed or are planned to be stationed at its request."²⁸ In particular, it expressed its readiness to enter

into relevant negotiations “with the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the other parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary.”²⁹ In other words, the Warsaw Pact members would be able jointly to determine policy affecting each member.

With the events in Hungary fresh in the background, the Kremlin hastened to take more practical steps to regulate relations with its people’s republics. Agreements on the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe were concluded with their host countries (Poland on 17 December 1956; East Germany on 12 March 1957, and Hungary on 27 May). On 15 April 1957 an agreement was signed in Bucharest between the Soviet and Romanian governments on the legal status of Soviet units stationed in Romania. The accord stated that the “temporary stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of the Romanian People’s Republic will in no way affect the sovereignty of the Romanian state; the Soviet troops will not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Romanian People’s Republic.”³⁰ It provided that the strength and location of the Soviet forces in Romania would be subject to arrangements between the two governments.³¹

After Khrushchev had assumed full control in the Kremlin by the summer of 1957, he continued to discuss in the Politburo and with senior military commanders the issue of military cuts and withdrawal of troops from Warsaw Pact countries. According to Khrushchev’s memoirs, the issue of the presence of troops in Romania was decided in the context of the need to reduce

military expenditures and the size of our army, particularly our units stationed in the other Warsaw Pact countries. No longer were we looking through Stalinist eyeglasses at the danger posed by capitalism. Of course, we were still surrounded by capitalist bases, but now that we had missiles as well as atomic and hydrogen bombs, the socialist camp had one of the mightiest armed forces in the world.³²

It should also be mentioned that in October 1957 the Soviets startled the world by launching *Sputnik 1*, the first artificial satellite into space.

In this atmosphere of self-confidence in its military capabilities and a shift in its military doctrine, at the beginning of 1958 Moscow appears to have made the decision to reduce Warsaw Pact forces and to withdraw its units from Romania. On 7 January the Soviets officially announced a reduction of their forces from Eastern Europe.³³ Consequently, Bucharest

was anxiously waiting for an announcement on the status of the 5 Soviet divisions stationed on Romanian soil.

The newly declassified Romanian documents show that officially this Soviet initiative Khrushchev presented for the first time in a letter to the Communist leadership in Bucharest on 17 April 1958. In the name of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Khrushchev informed Gheorghiu-Dej and the Central Committee of the RWP of Moscow's desire to consult on the issue of "further stationing of the Soviet troops on the territory of the Romanian People's Republic."³⁴ The Central Committee of the CPSU was convinced that the stationing of Soviet units on Romanian territory was no longer necessary, although recognizing that their presence "served both the interests of the Romanian People's Republic and the interests of our common cause and until recently it proved, undeniably, necessary and consistent with its aim."³⁵

Notwithstanding this positive contribution, the international situation has experienced a noticeable improvement. The peaceful policy of the socialist camp "made possible a certain thaw in international tensions." Romania experienced significant achievements "in socialist building and in strengthening its people's democracy system." Among these successes was a reliable military force "able to respond to the imperialists' challenges, to defend the Romanian people's socialist conquests and make its contribution to the cause of defending the common interests of the socialist camp." But, more than these accomplishments, the Soviet letter points out that "*imperialist circles, in order to serve their anti-Soviet propaganda and to slander the Romanian People's Republic, make large use of the fact that Soviet troops are still stationed on your country's territory.*"³⁶ In other words, the letter stressed the need for the Soviet and Romanian Communist leaders to "discuss as soon as possible the question of withdrawing the Soviet armed forces" from Romanian territory and "release a relevant press communique." The Soviets were convinced that the removal of their troops from Romania

would be a new concrete and convincing proof of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, of the Romanian People's Republic and of the socialist camp as a whole, of our common tendency to obtain, not by words, but by deeds, a relaxation of international tensions. Such an act would deprive imperialist circles of one of their significant arguments in favor of their policy of military preparation and would contribute to uniting the forces that pronounce them-

selves for the safeguarding and consolidation of peace, for peaceful coexistence among states.”³⁷

In conclusion, Khrushchev in the name of the Central Committee of the CPSU solicited the opinion of the CC of the RWP in this matter.

The Romanian response came almost a week later. On 23 April 1958, Gheorghiu-Dej wrote that Bucharest shared the view that the Soviet troops on Romanian territory “served both the interests of the Romanian People’s Republic and the interests of the common cause of the socialist camp.” In light of the improved international situation, the Romanians expressed their agreement to the proposed withdrawal of these units stationed in Romania. The Romanian Communist leadership also evaluated the propaganda opportunity in the removal of these troops. “We have no doubt whatsoever that this decision will have a major impact and would be seen by world public opinion as a new concrete contribution of the USSR, of the Romanian People’s Republic and of the entire socialist camp, to the strengthening of peace and the lessening of tensions in international relations.”³⁸

At the same time, Gheorghiu-Dej and the Central Committee of the RWP felt compelled to allay the Soviet concern, assuring the Kremlin that the Romanian armed forces “shall fulfil honorably, in whatever circumstances, the duties incumbent on them within the socialist camp.” The letter, however, left to Moscow the decision as to the timing of the “meeting to discuss this matter.”

On 24 May 1958, a month following the Khrushchev-Gheorghiu-Dej April exchange of letters, the two sides concluded in Moscow an agreement concerning the departure of the Soviet troops “temporarily stationed on the Romanian territory.” The accord regulated the official withdrawal and the transfer of all assets involved. Furthermore, it established a timetable for the departure of Soviet troops from the People’s Republic of Romania over the period 15 June-15 August 1958. According to Article 4, in the interests of the security of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, Romania obligated itself to maintain in the state of permanent readiness a number of air and naval bases, formerly under Soviet control, to be placed for the eventual use of the joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty.³⁹

This bilateral accord and its timing must be viewed in the general context of Cold War developments. The announcement regarding the signing of the Romanian-Soviet accord was made at the Warsaw Pact meeting

in Moscow on the same day, 24 May 1958. It was no coincidence that the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact duly approved the concluded accord and the Soviet announcement of the withdrawal from Romania. At the same time, these decisions were followed by the communiqué announcing Soviet and Warsaw Pact military cuts of 419,000 men in Eastern Europe.⁴⁰ In addition to the Soviet cuts of 300,000, previously announced, the following reduction was to take place: Albania (1,000), Bulgaria (23,000), Czechoslovakia (20,000), Poland (20,000), and Romania (55,000).

Within a short time, the terms of the accord were fulfilled and the fourteen-year period of “temporary” stationing of Soviet military units on Romanian territory came to a close. On 25 July 1958, the last of the 35,000 Soviet troops left Romania, according to a *Radio Bucharest* announcement.⁴¹ Thus, what began in 1955 culminated in the summer of 1958, but this withdrawal must be viewed in its proper historical context.

In the Cold War of 1958, the United States and the West in general recognized that troop strengths in Eastern Europe as a whole had not changed and that Romania remained vulnerable to Soviet forces stationed beyond its borders. Justifiably, Washington was unwilling to reduce its commitment to NATO ground forces as Khrushchev apparently had hoped. It can be seen, however, as a practical move in the Cold War Soviet propaganda.

At the same time, as Khrushchev records, the withdrawal of armed forces from Romania was part of the Soviet reexamination of the rationale for troop deployments in Eastern Europe. “We had to economize on our army abroad as well as at home,” reminisced Khrushchev. “The maintenance of a division abroad—that is, on the territory of another socialist country—costs twice as much as the maintenance of a division on our own territory.” Along this line of reasoning, he notes that “the strength of a modern army isn’t determined by the number of troops but by fire power, particularly missile power. We had stockpiled a great many nuclear weapons, so our fire power had increased many times and we could afford to cut back on our ground troops. Gradually we reduced our standing army from about 5 million to 2 ½ million.”⁴²

The key foreign policy element was the unilateral Soviet move to withdraw a limited number of troops from Eastern Europe as a whole which, Khrushchev hoped, might encourage a similar response from NATO. In any case, this limited departure would not undermine Moscow’s military advantages in the area, where socialism was by now safely established.

The withdrawal of Soviet units from Romania in the summer of 1958 must be placed in the context of the general developments of Cold War Europe: the public initiatives of the Soviet Union for reduction of all foreign troops in Europe, intending to induce a reduction of the US troops located in West Germany; the self-confidence of the Soviet leadership, influenced by the qualitative changes in the armament and the consequently changed military doctrine; the Kremlin's reorientation of policy from Southeastern Europe to Central Europe, i.e., Germany, which again became a focal point in East-West tensions in 1958. As the region's strategic importance in the Cold War diminished and the Communist regime in Romania was firmly in control of the country, the new development enabled the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops without being concerned about Romania's reliability as an ally and at the same time score points in the cold war propaganda.

This development also affected Romania and its leadership. The withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1958 enabled Gheorghiu-Dej to take the first significant steps to diminish Soviet influence over Romanian foreign policy, while at the same time maintain strict control over domestic developments. This policy the communist regime pursued successfully until the fall of communism in December 1989.

NOTES

1. Dennis P. Hupchick, *The Balkans: from Constantinople to Communism* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 412.
2. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 186-187.
3. See Leonid Gibianskii, "Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 139-148 (143 on the date). On Bucharest's role in the Nagy affair, see Sergiu Verona, *Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944-1958* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 104-105, and Dennis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu, *Romania and the Warsaw Pact: 1955-1989*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper # 43 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2004), 11.
4. Ioan Scurtu, "Introducere," in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958* [Romania. Withdrawal of Soviet Troops. 1958], coordinating editor Ioan Scurtu (București: Editura didactică pedagogică R.A., 1996), 50 and 68.
5. Scurtu, "Introducere," in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 49 and 67-68.
6. For the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe, see R. J. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After*, 2d ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 211-239.
7. Doc. 23, "Treaty of Peace with Romania," 10 February 1947, Paris, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 165.

8. Docs. 26, 27, and 28, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 171-200.
9. "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France—Austria: State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria," 15 May 1955, Vienna, in *The American Journal of International Law*, 49, no. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (October 1955), 163, 168-169, and 191.
10. Robert L. Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," *The Western Political Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (December 1968): 664.
11. Doc. 41, Interview, Gheorghe Apostol with Ioan Scurtu and Virginia Călin, 20 October 1994, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 224-225.
12. The official name of the Romanian Communist Party from February 1948 until 1965.
13. Scurtu, "Introducere," in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 41 and 59.
14. Doc. 41, Interview, Gheorghe Apostol with Ioan Scurtu and Virginia Călin, 20 October 1994, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 224-225.
15. "Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, U.S.S.R.: Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance," 14 May 1955, Warsaw, in *The American Journal of International Law*, 49, no. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (October 1955), 194-199.
16. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 227-228.
17. Doc. 41, Interview, Gheorghe Apostol with Ioan Scurtu and Virginia Călin, 20 October 1994, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 224-225.
18. *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*, 227. On the visit and different interpretations regarding the location and content of discussion on the issue, see Verona, *Military Occupation and Diplomacy*, 80-86.
19. Deletant and Ionescu, *Romania and the Warsaw Pact*, 14. This point also in Verona, *Military Occupation and Diplomacy*, 85.
20. "We just didn't want you to think we were standing firmly on a socialist position only because your troops are stationed on our country. We just want you to know that we sincerely believe in the building of socialism and in following Marxist-Leninist policies, and our people recognize us as their leaders and support us completely. The development of socialism in our country is not determined by pressure from the Soviet Union" (*Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*, 228).
21. As related in Doc. 41, Interview, Gheorghe Apostol with Ioan Scurtu and Virginia Călin, 20 October 1994, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 225.
22. *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*, 227.
23. Scurtu, "Introducere," in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 44 and 62.
24. Text of the speech in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, X (1955-1956), 14992A; Nikita Khrushchev, "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 25 February 1956 [excerpts], in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), *The Structure of Soviet History. Essays and Documents* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 340-350.
25. The members were the Communist and Workers' Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union.
26. "Announcement on the Dissolution of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, 18 April 1956," in *Documents on International Affairs, 1956* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), 377.
27. On the Hungarian-Soviet relationship at this time, see Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,"

Journal of Contemporary History 32, 2 (April 1998): 163-214.

28. "Declaration of the Soviet Government on the Foundations for the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States, 30 October 1956," in *Documents on International Affairs, 1956* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), 467.

29. *Ibid.*, 468.

30. Doc. 49, Accord between the Government of the Romanian People's Republic and the Government of the USSR, 15 April 1957, Bucharest, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 247.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*, 228.

33. Scurtu, "Introducere," in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 66.

34. Doc. 57, Nikita S. Khrushchev, First-Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, to the CC of the RWP, Letter, 17 April 1958, Moscow, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 273.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

37. *Ibid.*, 273-274.

38. Doc. 58, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First-Secretary of the CC of the RWP, to CC of the CPSU, Letter, 23 April 1958, Bucharest, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 274-275.

39. Doc. 60, Accord between the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Romanian People's Republic and the Defense Minister of the U.S.S.R., 24 May 1958, Moscow, and Doc. 73, Decision of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Romania on the application of the Agreement concluded in Moscow on May 24, 1958 establishing the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania, 21 June 1958, Bucharest, in *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, 276-280, and 342-344.

40. "Communiqué on the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization," 24 May 1958, Moscow, in *Documents on International Affairs, 1958* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), 499.

41. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XI (1957-1958), 16350C.

42. *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*, 221.

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