Becoming Enlightened: National Backwardness and Revolutionary Ideology

Aaron B. Retish

In December 1919 in the Udmurt village Ludoshur, a drama troupe and political agitators from the regional teachers’ institute put on a series of shows for the peasant population. They sang traditional Udmurt songs and gave courses on Soviet politics and the current political situation, all in the Udmurt language. During intermissions the performers explained the songs and tried to enroll the youth. According to newspaper reports, despite poor performances, all the peasants thoroughly enjoyed the shows.¹ Similar cultural events were held in villages throughout the land inhabited by Udmurts in the early years of the Soviet regime.

The tsarist, Provisional Government, and Soviet states all conducted cultural and political events resembling the one above. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Russia, like West European states, attempted to transform its subjects into useful cultured citizens of a modern nation-state. Russia’s political leaders believed that in order to make this transition, non-Russians had to overcome their “national backwardness.”²

This paper studies the intersection between images and politics of national backwardness in Revolutionary Russia (from the beginning of the First World War through the end of Russia’s Civil War in 1921). It focuses on the meaning and significance of state education and enlightenment projects for the non-Russian peasant population. I argue that central figures in the nationalist cause, specifically educators and the revolutionary Bolshevik state maintained consistent ideas that non-Russians were uneducated, unenlightened, and culturally backwards. As early as 1918, Bolsheviks and national elites voluntarily joined together to impose a modern consciousness upon Udmurts and Mari. While state agents and national elites dominated the discourse, they engaged in a dialogue with peasants over what constituted acceptable national culture.³

I present a case study of Viatka province, located in the northeast corner of European Russia. Viatka had a significant non-Russian peasantry of Udmurts, Mari, and Komi—all Finno-Ugric peoples—as well as Turkic Tatars, who together accounted for over half of the population in much of the South and East of the province.⁴
In the late-tsarist era, there was wide public debate about how Russia’s various peoples fit into the Empire. Russia’s educated elite saw the Russian peasantry as both the heart of Russian tradition and as uncultured, backward, unclean, and half-pagan. If Russian peasants were bad, non-Russian peasants were worse. Russian cultural elites saw non-Russian peasants as a magnification of the Russian peasantry’s ills. Ethnographers placed non-Russian peoples into a hierarchy of culture, based on their assumptions of organic nationality. Ethnographers studying Russia’s “others,” found a variety of difference among the nationalities, from young savage nationalities to more advanced, yet still unenlightened nations. In Viatka, Tatars were below Russians, followed by Mari, with Udmurts taking up the rear.

The nineteenth-century philosopher and revolutionary Alexander Herzen dabbled in ethnographic writing while exiled in Viatka. As was typical of borderland studies of non-Russians in the mid-nineteenth century, Herzen ranked the progress of Russian, Mari, and Udmurt peasants with Russians as the most advanced, Mari as maturing, and Udmurts as primitive savages. At the heart of Herzen’s narrative was cleanliness. While Herzen writes that Russian peasant structures were well built and clean, the Udmurts’

[o]n the contrary, are built in heaps. They are unclean, gloomy, and . . . without the slightest order. In the huts, the uncleanliness is terrible. Continuous smoke comes from under the broiler. Pigs, calves, and chickens are everywhere with the [Udmurts] in the filth under the huts.

Herzen continues to describe Udmurts as shy and simple people; pagans who are being unjustly converted by the Orthodox Church; and who speak an incoherent language without the grammatical rules necessary for coherent speech. Mari in contrast do not have the [Udmurts’] shyness. They are wild and persistent. The [Mari] are much more attached to their customs and religion. The [Udmurts] are small, and physically weak; the [Mari] in general are more robust and stronger. Their religious understanding is sharper than the [Udmurts] and their priests are chosen from the smarter, more experienced [Mari].

Other ethnographers and historians echoed Herzen’s description of Udmurts
and added that they lagged behind Russians in cultural evolution. Many state officials had similar negative images of Udmurts and Mari, describing them as “brown mice” and “filthy people.”

Images of non-Russians as backward and primitive also shaped state policies. Although large armaments factories were situated in the middle of Udmurt regions, few Udmurts actually worked in the factories. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Viatka governor stated, Udmurts “do not have the ability to do factory work. Moreover, they do not know Russian. They will be more useful for the region in agricultural production.”

**Education and Cultural Enlightenment**

According to many of Russia’s scholars, the best means to raise the cultural level and evolution of non-Russians was through education. Formal education among non-Russian peasants was limited before the mid-nineteenth century. While the number of schools grew in the late-nineteenth century, the number of students remained low. In the beginning of the twentieth century, only 5.3 percent of Udmurts were literate (compared to 17.2 percent of Russians). However, as Steven Duke shows, government and local initiatives from the late-nineteenth century until the beginning of World War I spurred the growth of schools, literacy, and school attendance for non-Russians. In 1916, literacy had grown to 14.7 percent among Udmurt males and 37 percent of Udmurt households had at least one literate or semi-literate member. Udmurt boys represented a slightly higher percentage of the school population than they did as a percentage of the whole population.

Most pupils were educated through the Il’minskii method (named after the priest and professor of Turkic languages Nikolai Ivanovich Il’minskii), that tried to show non-Russians that Russian civilization was better than their own. The Il’minskii method educated and missionized non-Russians by beginning to teach in the native language, then gradually switching to Russian. The method shows that Russian scholars believed that language was integral to national evolution.

The education efforts produced a small, but significant corps of national teachers and intellectuals. In 1897, southeast Viatka (where most of the province’s Udmurts lived and amounted to approximately 28 percent of the total population), 46 out of 411 rural pedagogues (or eleven percent) were Udmurts. This central core of teachers began to agitate actively for
Udmurt schooling in their native language. Education was the means to raise the Udmurt cultural standard and promote national unity among its people. In the pre-Revolutionary era the national elite, who was almost exclusively teachers, embraced Russian ethnographic description of Udmurt cultural backwardness and used it to advance education and nationalist efforts.

While World War I damaged the formal education effort by taking essential materials and instructors, national elites advanced cultural development on other fronts. The first Udmurt language newspaper, Voinays’ ivor (To Fight a War) began in 1915. It published news from the front as well as advice on agriculture and hygiene. In August 1917, Voinays’ ivor became Udmort and expanded its cultural advice to include popular nationalist mobilization. For example, the editor told his readers that freedom for Udmurts meant the ability to study in their own language and unity.

Officials in the semiautonomous local governmental zemstvo organization tried to train Udmurts and Mari in beekeeping, an occupation historically associated with the Finno-Ugric peoples of Viatka. At the turn of the century, zemstvo programs headed by A. P. Batuev and I. E. Shavrov, the latter known as “the apostle of rational beekeeping,” transformed traditional non-Russian beekeeping into a more “rational” production. The zemstvo established popular courses and training programs in beekeeping. It also successfully advocated for peasants throughout southern Viatka to switch from keeping beehives in customized tree stumps, to storing them in miniature, orderly houses. The success of the zemstvo programs shows that non-Russian peasants were willing to engage the Russian state and improve on traditional occupations.

1917: Revolutionary Politics and Notions of National Backwardness

The 1917 February Revolution that overthrew the tsar and established the democratic Provisional Government in its place gave hope to non-Russians. People shared the belief that revolutionary politics could transform society. Revolutionary Russia embraced the Enlightenment’s political rationality in which politics was based on the theory of representation and citizenship. Peasants’ education and cultural development were integral to the discourse surrounding citizenship.

Ceremonies during revolutionary holidays, for example, showed that peasants’ new freedom centered around education and cultural development. The ceremonies reinforced the metaphor of education through the prominent role of the teacher. Village instructors often gave general speeches on the
current moment and lectures on topics which they believed should concern the peasantry. They also taught the population, through revolutionary songs, how to communicate in the new revolutionary age. In Slobodskoi region, 3000 peasants celebrated the holiday of the Revolution by attending a mass at the village square. They sang revolutionary songs and heard the local doctor speak about buying bonds of freedom. The crowd proceeded to the school, where an arch had been built. On one side of the arch read, “learning is enlightenment, and ignorance is darkness,” on the other side was written, “Welcome universal, free education.” Amidst this backdrop, the teacher gave a speech about the need for education. Local elites equated the Revolution with spiritual and intellectual enlightenment. The prominent role of education and religion in revolutionary citizenship shows that the local Provisional Government elites attempted to shape and control the imagination of the peasantry.

The peasants supported the elite’s emphasis on education in order to gain additional resources for their villages. Peasants attended and participated in the celebrations focusing on the schools. They also adopted and used elite rhetoric on educational enlightenment and cultural development. Peasants often tried to get the new government to repair or build a school in their village. For example, peasants in Petropavlov hamlet, Iaransk region, had a meeting in which they unanimously supported the democratic republic of Russia and demanded the immediate opening of a school and reading hut in their area so their children would have “the ability to enter a new life as enlightened citizens.”

Education also served as a medium through which the population discussed the role of non-Russians in the Revolution. Both Russian and national intellectuals used the political transformation as an opportunity to stress their long-standing argument that non-Russian peasants needed general education to raise their cultural level. Beginning in mid-1917, non-Russians held congresses throughout the Viatka region. Representatives (including peasants, intellectuals, and clergy) called for nationally autonomous schooling. They argued that the tsarist regime’s policy of Russification had culturally oppressed their nationality by only teaching their children Russian. Education of Mari, Udmurt, and Tatar youths, representatives argued, must be done by teachers of their own nationality in their mother tongue. For example, education dominated discussion at the conference of Mari in mid-1917. The congress decided to establish schools to teach Mari culture, history, ethnography, and geography in the mother tongue and to prepare teachers from the Mari population. They also decided to open libraries and
reading huts with books and newspapers in Mari.30

**Bolshevik Nationality Policies**

The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 ushered in a new political and cultural era. The Bolsheviks wanted not only to transform politics, but also to recreate society and culture—to build a proletarian culture and a new soviet person.31 Through education, newspapers, theater, literature, mass spectacles, and so forth, the new Soviet state tried to reorient old symbols and create a space for proletarian culture to emerge.32 Nevertheless, despite trying to destroy the old culture and build a new one, the Bolshevik elite maintained ideas from the tsarist era.

Narkomnats (The People’s Commissariat of Nationality Affairs) was the central governmental organ of cultural affairs among non-Russians. Historians have noted that Narkomnats was an instrument for “coopting radical national elites” in order to gain mass support from nationalities,33 and “the direct representative of the national minorities to the central government.”34 It is important to note that it was also the main instrument in disseminating national culture. While the Soviet policy of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*), the advancement of national culture through promoting national language and elites, officially emerged after the Civil War in 1923, regional sections of Narkomnats were implementing the essence of this policy already in 1918. Moreover, the official Soviet practice of promoting national culture repeated the demands of nationality congresses from 1917 for national education, literature, and the training of indigenous elites.

Following requests from national elites, Udmurt and Mari sections of Narkomnats were established in mid-1918. Former teachers dominated the Udmurt section. Narkomnats was therefore not simply a top-down institution that coopted national elites. National elites themselves used the Soviet state and Narkomnats to further their nationalist causes and implement their notions of cultural progress. The Soviet nationalities policy played into and extended national elite’s imagination of Udmurt national culture.

Bolshevik policy toward nationalities was also based on ideology. Central Communist Party leaders believed that all nations had equal rights and thus attempted to give them opportunity. In a policy that paralleled tsarist ethnographic interpretation, the Soviet regime saw many of its eastern nations as backward, although the socialist regime based their assessment on industrialization, urbanization, literacy, and so forth.35 For example,
Soviet officials described Udmurts as “hardly cultured” (malokul’turnyi) and “very backward in the realm of cultural and political development.” Such descriptions helped to explain why non-Russians did not actively support the proletarian revolution. The Soviets therefore adopted a nationalities policy promoting national culture for “backwards” nations through the advancement of education, language, and the training of indigenous elites.

Early Bolshevik policy continued the philosophy behind the Il’minskii teaching method from the tsarist era; that only education in the nationality’s tongue can convert non-believers. The new state also ordered the construction of new village national schools and went to great lengths to recruit those able to teach and agitate in the national language. Officials recalled qualified soldiers and even freed men jailed for desertion and sabotage in order to do cultural work among the “dark masses.” As in education, the Bolsheviks tried to distribute literature in the nationality’s language, including books of poetry, political brochures, and newspapers. Besides primary level schools, Soviets organized a variety of cultural activities among non-Russian peasants to help them become more aware of their national heritage and to raise their cultural level. Bolsheviks organized reading huts, libraries, reading clubs, people’s houses, national drama circles, orchestras, choruses, concerts, lectures in both Russian and the national language, and spectacles every Sunday.

The state tied enlightenment activities to political agitation. Non-Russians learned about their history through the language of class warfare and the Soviets began to inculcate communist revolutionary politics. Local soviets made calendars in Udmurt with portraits of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Lev Trotsky, and Anatoly Lunacharskii on them. Communist Party agitators went throughout the countryside to explain Bolshevik politics and ideology among the peasants in the national tongue. As in 1917, all acts were political and the state believed that politics could transform society. As a Soviet editorialist wrote in 1921:

Finally, after many centuries the star of enlightenment begins to shine and burns brighter and brighter every day in the [Udmurt] family. The morality and soul of the forgotten [Udmurt] people (narod) under Soviet power is waking from a long nightmare.

Starting in 1919, Moscow allowed nationalities to form their own republics or autonomous regions. From Viatka, the Mari Autonomous Re-
region was formed in October 1920 and the Udmurt Autonomous Region in November 1920. The Soviet government needed allies during the Civil War and was willing to concede a degree of political autonomy to nationalities.

But Bolsheviks were hampered by practical limitations. They had little administrative infrastructure and few ardent supporters among the non-Russians. Years of civil war had taken away able personnel and destroyed schools. The regional nationalities division complained to Moscow that for two hundred fifty thousand Udmurts, they had only one agitator. As the above desperate attempts at recruiting agitators shows, the state wanted and tried to implement wide-ranging cultural enlightenment projects, but they did not have the available workers or resources even to make significant progress. Even in 1921, after the Bolsheviks had defeated the anti-Soviet forces, local officials reported that almost all the schools were destroyed and they had neither building materials, nor working hands for repairs. The majority of schools’ instructors were inexperienced and there was no money to pay their salary. In Udmurt villages that had opened libraries, many had no literature in the national language.

Material deprivations and continued non-Russian peasant suspicion of Bolshevik politics kept non-Russians out of the Communist Party. In 1920, only seven Tatars out of almost sixteen thousand belonged to the Party in the Viatka countryside. In Mashveev hamlet, which was 94 percent Udmurt, only a third of the governing board was Udmurt. The regional and central Communist Party leaders were keenly aware of their failure to recruit non-Russians and around 1920 began to devote considerable resources to rectify the problem. For example, in the Udmurt Autonomous Region, the Soviets recruited a number of Udmurts to study at the urban party school. When some of the students did not show up, the Party went to the extreme measure of seeking them out in their village. In another instance, the Party devoted resources to teach an illiterate potential political Udmurt agitator to read.

Nevertheless, Soviet education and enlightenment policies gradually succeeded. By 1920, there were 450 Udmurt and 188 Mari schools, of which a hundred were built by the Soviets. Through affirmative action policies of the 1920s, more non-Russians entered the Party. In 1926, the Udmurt literacy rate had risen to 25.6 percent, up from less than 10 percent on the eve of the First World War. This level was still well below the Russian literacy rate of 45 percent, but still constituted a remarkable rapid state-sponsored improvement.
Under the tsarist, Provisional Government, and Soviet regimes, non-Russians had special cultural obligations based solely on their nationality. During the tsarist regime’s colonial-model empire, Udmurts and Mari were seen as backward, based on academics’ notions of organic nationality. The best way for them to progress, according to many scholars, was through the adoption of the Russian metropole’s culture and Russian Orthodoxy. Provisional Government political elites, while not surviving long enough to implement their policies, showed through festivals and public discourse that they believed freedom and participation in national politics as citizens meant something special for non-Russians. The beginning of participatory politics under the Provisional Government also furthered the cause for national liberation. In national congresses and newspaper articles by non-Russians, leaders called for education and cultural projects to develop their consciousness and help to free them from the centuries-old yoke of tsarist oppression. Finally, the Soviets maintained the discourse of cultural development and promoted national culture in order to bring the nationalities up to the level of the Russians in order to build a rational, socialist utopia.

NOTES


2. I use nation throughout this paper to describe the various non-Russian ethnic populations. Although most non-Russians did not have a sense of national sentiment with their fellow ethnic group, intellectuals and the Russian government understood these groups as nationalities, as discussed below.

3. This paper in part parallels work by Francine Hirsch, who also demonstrates continuity in the national modernizing state project and willing participation from tsarist experts. However, I focus on an earlier period and more ground-level developments. See Francine Hirsch, "Empire of Nations: Colonial Technologies and the Making of the Soviet Union, 1917-1929," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1998). I will limit my discussion to these two nationalities. Tatars, the other major non-Russian population in Viatka, had independent issues due to their unique historical status in the Russian Empire and the fact that they were Muslim. I discuss Tatars from 1914-1921 further in my dissertation, "Peasant Identities in Russia’s Turmoil: Status, Gender, and Ethnicity in Viatka Province, 1914-21" (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 2003).

4. According to the Viatka Province Statistical Commission in 1913, 78% of the population was Russian, 12% was Udmurt, 4.5% was Mari, and 4% was Tatar. There was also an insignificant amount of Permiaks, Chuvash, and Bashkirs in the province. A. S. Bystrova et al., eds., Ustanovlenie i uprochenie sovetskoi vlasti v Viatskoi gubernii: Sbornik dokumentov (Kirov: Kirovskoe knizhnnoe izdatel’stvo, 1957), 24-26.

5. Stephen Frank, Crime, Cultural Conflict, and Justice in Rural Russia, 1856-1914 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 9-10, 276-306; Cathy A.


8. For clarity, continuity, and cultural sensitivity I use the current names of the non-Russians. Up to the early Soviet era, Russians called Udmurts Votiaks and Mari Cheremis. The terms Votiak and Cheremis now have pejorative connotations.


10. Ibid., 371.


23. Viatskoe pchelovodstvo (January 1914), 1-2.


36. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation, hereafter GARF), fond (collection) 318, op. 5, d.3, ll. 26, 96, 299, 424, 528 Sometimes, officials would specify that Udmurts were hardly cultured in the realm of education.

37. Smith, 23.

38. Despite growing scholarly interest in Soviet nationalities policy, most accounts limit themselves to the western nationalities (such as Ukrainians and Poles), focus on how central policies were made, or begin in the 1920s when the central Soviet organs built a more concrete policy of korenizatsiia.


40. GARF, f. 1318, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 424, 604, 748.

41. GARF, f. 1318, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 22, 25; Kul’turnoe stroitel’stvo v Udmurtii, 42-45, 62.


43. GARF, f. 1318, op. 5, d. 3, l. 374.

44. “O votiakakh,” Zhizn’ krest’ianina (Glazov: January 11, 1921), 1.

45. GARF, f. 1318, op. 5, d. 27, l. 186.

46. Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, hereafter RGASPI), f. 17, op. 60, d. 106, ll. 5, 7; GARF, f. 1318, op. 5, d. 27, ll. 19ob, 20ob.

47. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 61, d. 131, l. 3

48. GARF, f. 1318, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 442, 593.


50. Martin, 127.