Constantius’ Adlection of Themistius to the Byzantine Senate: “Élite Mobility in the Late Roman Empire”

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In 355 Themistius was adlected into the senate of Constantinople by Constantius II. This imperial appointment initiated the distinguished political career of that scholar-official whose service to the state would span three decades and encompass terms as proconsul, ambassador, court tutor, and urban prefect during the reigns of Constantius, Valens, and Theodosius. Yet, although this message (commonly referred to as the Constantii oratio) constitutes contemporary testimony about Themistius’ prospects as well as successes on the cusp of his life in government from the emperor himself, not much attention has been paid to Constantius’ extant communication to the senate on 1 September 355—read to the senate on 1 September 355—announcing and explaining the submission of his name for a decision (albeit invariably pro forma) by that deliberative body.¹ Instead, it has remained, even for scholarship of the early Byzantine Empire, what Bidez a half-century ago characterized as “[t]his curious document.”² However, that neglect is simply not warranted, particularly since, as this paper will argue, Themistius’ induction into the senatorial order not only marked a turning point in the philosopher’s personal biography but also—and more importantly—signaled a bold thrust in the emperor’s institutional policy.

Much of the puzzlement Byzantinists experience when reading this diploma “full of praise for the pagan orator and for ‘cultured Hellenic wisdom’ that [Themistius’] orations sought to propagate”³ is, of course, attributable to their generally low estimation of an emperor who, particularly when compared to his bookish cousin and successor, is thought to have been boorish. Even Alföldi’s frank acknowledgment that Constantius’ testimony constitutes “a formal confession of faith in the higher culture”⁴ implies a passive deference rather than a genuine adherence to the classical tradition on the part of the imperial patron. To be sure, Dagron has challenged that consensus, arguing that the letter of nomination, while admittedly more a rhetorical than historical document, nonetheless “carries exceptional import, albeit in a banal manner.”⁵ Though more sensitive to and sensible about the Constantii oratio, his interpretation still remains committed to the view that the imperial communication, because of its flattering references to Themistius himself, is more superficial than substantial as evidence. Yet the impression shared
alike by Alföldi and Dagron that Constantius’ message suffers from naïveté is vulnerable to the same historiographical criticism Gene Wise leveled against Darrett Rutman’s *Winthrop’s Boston*:

What Rutman has done here [in arguing that John Winthrop was tragically disappointed by the failure of his community to realize in actuality the vision of “The City on a Hill”] is read “A Modell of Christian Charity” apart from its historical context—apart from the time and place it was delivered, apart from the audience it was delivered to, and, in a sense, even apart from the man who gave it . . .

However, by adopting a “situation-strategy” reading of Constantius’ words in the fourth century no less than Winthrop’s fourteen centuries later, “we don’t assume”—to apply Ruttman’s theory—“that he intended to describe reality with his words; rather, we assert that he used those words to affect reality, doubtless realizing that reality would never wholly submit to his strategies.”

The premise of this paper, therefore, is simply that the document tucked away in the Themistian corpus can tell us about Constantius and his political world as much as (if not more than) it can about Themistius and his intellectual world. After all, even though the subject was Themistius (himself, of course, a pagan promoting a political philosophy quite amenable to the interests of the Constantinian dynasty), the letter was composed by the son and successor of the first Christian dynasty and addressed to senators whose very institution had only been established by Constantine in his new, eponymous capital. In other words, the *Constantii oratio* was not merely an address about Themistius, as most commentators have treated it; rather, it was just as much a message to the newly minted Constantinopolitan senate as well as (by extension) to the Greek East. By pointing out the contextual facts of author and audience of this text, of course, “We are reminded [to quote Kenneth Burke]

that every document bequeathed us by history must be treated as a strategy for encompassing a situation. Thus, when considering some document like the American Constitution, we shall be automatically warned not to consider it in isolation, but as the answer or rejoinder to assertions current in the situation in which it arose."
Accordingly, if one assumes that Constantius’ rhetoric functioned like any other document as an attempt to maneuver no less than mirror reality, then it is both necessary and possible to discern from his words the specific set of conditions he was responding to as well as reflecting.

The principal clue to unraveling the structure and substance of the Constantii oratio is the occasion itself, namely, the emperor’s explanation in 355 to the assembled senators of Constantinople (the ancient Byzantium) of his promotion of a distinguished professor into their corporate ranks. The parties involved in this transaction—a Christian emperor, a pagan intellectual, and a regional aristocracy—had represented, by the middle of the fourth century, interests that had a history of political, social, and ideological rivalry, if not enmity. But Constantius’ decision to appoint Themistius to the Byzantine senate suggests an attempt to move beyond past conflict and, instead, create consensus among the Christian monarchy, the pagan academy, and the local aristocracy. It is this insight, generated from a re-viewing of the circumstances of the Constantii oratio, that prompts, in turn, pursuing a line of inquiry based on the theoretical construct of “Élite Mobility in the Roman Empire” fashioned by Keith Hopkins, whose premise is that social mobility in the Roman Empire is a function of an on-going political conflict between the emperor and the aristocracy.9 According to Hopkins,

The techniques and institutions which developed in response to this conflict involved social mobility. Firstly, since it was aristocratic exercise of power which threatened the emperor’s supremacy, the emperor could and did employ non-aristocrats in positions of power. Secondly, emperors helped in the development of differentiated institutions . . . which also limited aristocratic power [by, inter alia, providing other “channels of upward mobility”]. Thirdly, emperors were interested in the uniform or maximum exploitation of the empire . . . [especially by means of] its political and administrative unification.10

Constantius’ nomination of Themistius fits the first feature enumerated in the Hopkins model. Indeed, adlectio itself was the procedure, involving both an imperial nomination and a senatorial ratification, by which a man without senatorial pedigree could become a member of the senate.11 Ordinarily, admission into that body, the bastion of the highest order in the ‘es-
state' society of the always status-conscious Greco-Roman world, depended, even for heirs of senators, meeting minimal criteria financially (one million sesterces), politically (election to formal posts), and socially (provided the requisite public games). The Roman patrician, Q. Symmachus Aurelius, Themistius' contemporary at Rome, perhaps best stated the basic qualifications for admission to the senatorial order: “Nature has given Synesius a good character, his father an excellent education, fortune adequate wealth” (Or. 7.29). Unlike the otherwise unknown Synesius, however, Themistius lacked the aristocratic pedigree; he had achieved, rather than assumed, the merits of his recommendation. Thus, the nominee’s “eminent fame” (Con. or. 19a) Constantius emphasized as a criterion for selection was the result of Themistius’ activity as a teacher and scholar. Moreover, he did come from a respectable family, what one might rightly term the gentry of late Roman imperial society. His father, Eugenius, was, according to the emperor’s communication (23a), a philosopher well known for his accomplishments to the Byzantine audience, as was his father-in-law. Nor was Eugenius an impoverished schoolman. A landowner with apparently considerable property in Paphlagonia to which he later retired (see Themistius' Or. 20, the eulogy delivered on the occasion of his father’s death), he could well afford the expense of his son’s education in what Marrou has identified as enkylikos logos. Endowed with a classical education and substantial inheritance (which Constantius notes in his own enunciation of norms for membership in the senate: 22b and 19b, respectively) as well as an enviable reputation, Themistius was, then, already a prominent member—socially, educationally, and financially—of the local élite of Constantinople.

The adlection of Themistius launched what became, almost immediately, a very successful career in the imperial service for most of the next thirty years. Under Constantius II, he played a prominent role in government: the leader of a senatorial embassy from the New Rome to the Old Rome in order to celebrate, with a speech delivered before an emperor fresh from victory over usurpers in the Italian curia (see Or. 3); his service as proconsul of Constantinople; his permanent appointment to the board composed of otherwise rotating members for the selection of praetors; and the imperial commission he received for the recruitment of members for the Byzantine senate from among the local elites of the Greek East. The accession of Julian to the throne upon the death of Constantius in 361 marked an eclipse in Themistius’ public career for reasons that are not entirely clear. Although the apostate emperor was a fellow pagan and former pupil of Themistius, their relationship, which had been maintained through correspondence while prior to 361, soured beyond repair: not only did Julian chastise Themistius
on ideological and political grounds, but Themistius, still a senator, most probably turned aside the new emperor’s proffer of office. In any event, the hiatus in public life proved temporary. After the death of Julian in his ill-fated campaign against the Persians, Themistius was delegated by the senate at Constantinople to give its official greetings to Jovian, the new emperor. In that panegyric (Or. 5), this spokesman of the senate congratulated Julian’s successor for introducing a policy of religious toleration as well as ceasing hostilities against Persia in the aftermath of his predecessor’s failures. Within a year, however, there was a new ruler in the East. Although he occupied no magistracy under Valens, the tempo of Themistius’s political career, which had flagged considerably since the death of Constantius, accelerated as he conducted embassies and commented on policies over the next fourteen years. The disaster at Adrianople, where Valens lost his life in August of 378, eventually brought Theodosius to the purple. This final decade of imperial service, during which he delivered a series of “political orations” elaborating on previous interpretations of an emperor’s roles as war-lord, law-lord, and cult-lord, the scholar-official himself designated as the culmination of his public career, the pinnacle of which was appointment as the urban prefect of Constantinople. (See Or. 34, his *apologia pro vita sua*).

On his own, of course, it is very unlikely that Themistius would have been admitted to the senate, much less have achieved such a prominent and distinguished career. The successes he achieved were the result of imperial favor. As such, the politics he practiced and the policies he promoted reflected what Hopkins has identified as the imperial rationale for sponsoring the social mobility of *arrivistes* by imperial service: “they were not identified with aristocratic interests, because their mobility made them more dependent upon, even grateful to the emperors, and because they might not be too easily assimilated to the [traditional] aristocracy.” To be sure, as a senator, Themistius became a member of the elite; but it was an aristocracy created by and dependent upon the emperor as its sustenance as well as source. Even the most cursory examination of Themistius’ policy speeches and political services reveal only that he was a fervent monarchist. And that was exactly what the emperor expected. Thus, in the final paragraph of his letter (23d), Constantius declared that in commending Themstius to the senate founded by his father he is likewise “consecrating a great gift to [Constantine] as well”

II

At the time Constantius recommended Themistius’ reception into the
senatorial order, the nominee had been, for more than a decade, a professor of philosophy in the eastern capital, and, as the Constantii oratio points out more than once, his teaching had made him a celebrity who drew students from across the Greek East. Holding the modern equivalent of an endowed chair, Themistius was entitled to a salary at public expense, which he refused to accept. (See his Or. 23.293a-b.) This biographical datum fits in, then, with what Hopkins identified as the second technique utilized by emperors for employing social mobility to neutralize aristocratic opposition, to wit, "the development of differentiated institutions [that] gave rise to interest groups, which limited aristocratic power." In pursuing that strategy, as Hopkins goes on to point out in this regard, "[t]hey certainly aided the development of differentiated institutions, for example, by establishing professorial chairs with state funding . . ." Thus, as a famous teacher and scholar whose philosophical career had, according to the emperor (20d-21a), contributed to the emergence of New Rome as the principal intellectual center of the eastern Empire, he belonged to that profession which was most amenable to and available for social mobility in Late Antiquity. Indeed, at the very time of his appointment to the Byzantine senate, Themistius had been being wooed by what he termed "the Siren song" (Or. 2.26b) of very generous offers of professorships in the more established university towns of Nicomedia, Ancyra, and Antioch. The emperor, apparently aware of the efforts to lure Themistius away from his capital, stated with particular emphasis his high regard for "a most illustrious man, a unique philosopher, a remarkable citizen of our community, a man whom someone could reasonably address as a citizen of the world" (22b-c). Adlection by imperial sponsorship, therefore, guaranteed the continued presence of the person most responsible for Constantinople’s recognition as “the universal seat of learning” (21a) in the Greek East.

Still, by adlecting the much celebrated and credentialed Themistius into the Byzantine senate, it appears that the emperor might very well also been wooing a larger audience. Indeed, it does not seem insignificant that Constantius regularly identified him in public documents as "Themistius the Philosopher" (Con.or.19a. and Cod Theod. VI.4.12). Both the emperor and the professor shared a commitment to what Constantius termed that "true philosophy which does not entirely banish itself from the life of the community nor completely abhors attention to public affairs" (22b). Themistius continuously stressed throughout both his private and public career that the practice of philosophy is the exercise of virtue or excellence. For philosophy, as he conceived it, was really the tradition of civilized conduct as established by the ancients and transmitted through the generations; it was, as Glanville
Downey put it, “an eclectic synthesis of the classical tradition.” But the synthesis was practical rather than theoretical in nature; didactic rather than speculative in purpose. An avowed Aristotelian (his academic reputation had been secured by the publication of his *Paraphrases of Aristotle’s works*), Themistius likewise identified his philosophy as “political.” Criticizing popular belief and common practice in his own day, he emphatically denied that the true philosopher is he “who argues high and low about syllogisms and who can scrutinize worthless arguments”; those so engaged, he insisted, were involved in “useless knowledge” (Or. 2.30b). Instead of such vacuous exercises, the true philosopher is committed to the dissemination of the principles of social morality and their implementation in political policy. For fundamental to all the thinking of Themistius was the basic certainty that, as he told Constantius five years before his own senatorial adlection, “only philosophers are the witnesses of virtue” (Or. I. 3d).

Themistius accordingly maintained that the canons of civility which the philosopher must profess demand by their very nature a wider currency among the public than the method of contemporary philosophical education provided. Hence, the philosopher who would be true to his genuine calling must quite the privacy of his cubicle and go out among the people. For he is no philosopher “who frequently expounds on virtue, confidence, and bravery to three or four youths while sitting on his pallet” (Or. 2.3b-c). It was, of course, such advocacy of a public philosophy that earned Themistius popular recognition and imperial approbation. Constantius, who frequently called Themistus’ philosophy “the ornament of his own kingship” (Or. 3l.354d), publicly elaborated on his esteem for the traditional vision of the philosopher’s role as a public educator in his letter of appointment:

[Themistius], whom the present speech extols, is not identified with a philosophy that is unconcerned with society, but he combines the good with work, and he imparts this with greater effort to those who want it. He is the spokesman of the ancient and wise men as well as the hierophant of the chapels and temples of philosophy. He does not let the ancient teachings die away, but makes them flourish and become fresh. And his own life is a model of living according to reason and of paying attention to education.

You also see at the same time, conscript fathers, that no function in human life would be discharged most auspiciously
and best without virtue, either privately or publicly. Because of their training and educating of youth, those who are well chosen as the leaders of philosophy should be considered the common fathers of all mankind. These men teach both the individual fathers how it is necessary to be treated by their sons and the children what kind of attention it is necessary to get from their fathers. And since I say these things briefly, the truth is that the philosopher is the judge and overseer of all. For he is the proved and precise standard of how one must deal with the public, how one must treat the senate—in a word, the standard of the entire civil polity. (20a-c)

Although Constantius was accused by contemporaries of a lack of culture that bordered on boorishness in his private life, in his official capacity at least he strongly encouraged and generously promoted the maintenance of the traditional learning as the basis of imperial governance (cf. Cod. Theod. XIV.1.1). By officially endorsing philosophy as “the noblest of the sciences” in his adlection of its most famous representative in the Greek East (23c), the emperor, then, was not merely confessing his faith in the higher culture (as Alföldi and Dagron point out) but also shrewdly co-opting (so to speak) a persistent if not pervasive source of opposition to the Constantinian state. As MacMullen has argued, the philosophers traditionally served, in both the Greek polis and the Latin civitas after the rise of centralized political authority, as the spokesmen of the most “subversive” element or group in the rational (as distinct from the traditional) political structures of antiquity, viz., the aristocracy. For a corollary of the premise of most late antique philosophy (with its predominantly neo-Platonist flavor) that schoolmen must eschew social involvement was the conviction—challenged by Themistius and concurred in by Constantius—that imperial government was a vitiation of the natural order. Making matters worse for the Constantinian dynasty was the fact that philosophy was not only aristocratic but also pagan. (This dual antagonism surfaced a few years later in the debate Themistius had with the Emperor Julian, ironically enough his former pupil as well as fellow pagan.)

In other words, Constantius’ adlection of Themistius, the pagan philosopher, also constituted, it seems, an effort to incorporate a tradition-ally hostile but nonetheless significant community of opinion in late Roman society into the Constantinian system. For the philosophical schools, which still served to certify credentials of advancement in the status-conscious
world of Late Antiquity, represented one of those key institutions which, in Hopkins’ words, “provided sources of power which limited [an emperor] and which he sought to control.” To the extent, then, that Constantine’s son was successful in recruiting into the imperial administration the grandson of one of Diocletian’s advisers associated with the last major persecution of the Christians and a man who would subsequently champion religious toler-
ance along Constantinian rather than Julianic lines he was also furthering “the development of differentiated institutions.”

III

This process became not only more evident but also more extensive when it is realized that soon thereafter Constantius commissioned Themistius with task of increasing substantially the size and composition of the Byzantine senate. Indeed, Themistius’ success in this effort by raising senatorial membership “from two hundred to almost three thousand” over the course of his three decades in that most exclusive club (Or. 34. c. xiv) contributed as much to the centralization of imperial power as, concurrently, to the differentiation of senatorial authority. And, according to the Hopkins model, the third technique for neutralizing the historical (if not natural) conflict between the monarchy and the aristocracy was to accelerate “the uniform or maximum exploitation of the empire . . . [a process that] involved mobility in the assimilation of provincials into the Roman honour system.”

Thus, it is quite understandable that the extraordinary success Themistius achieved on behalf of his patron by skimming the cream of regional élites in the Greek East provoked the alarm as well as incurred the scorn of his fellow ‘mandarin’ Libanius, the doyen of Antioch and defender of traditional curial interests in the provinces and their municipalities. For Libanius recognized implicitly what Hopkins explicitly theorized, namely, that “the development of differentiated institutions” like the Byzantine senate and the attendant consolidation of opportunities for promotion and advancement “limited aristocratic power.” Moreover, this differentiation of Constantinople’s senate by conscripting dignitaries from local communities in the East likewise tended to transform the relationships between the central and provincial societies—since, where the imperial interests were strengthened in the process, the regional interests were, if not divested, then weakened. And, at least from the perspective of an emperor like Constantius, the assimilation of local leadership represented by people like Themistius and his recruits—men who “were mostly ‘of good family’ and high standing within a local or provincial status system”—contributed to the realization of social mobility’s function: “they did not so much increase their fortunes as change their point of refer
ence from their locality to the empire.”

By definition, of course, social mobility has downward as well as upward effects—and not just on the status of those directly involved. Thus, the promotion of the Constantinopolitan senate had untoward results for the Latin West as well as the Greek East. For not only did the enrolment of local grandees from the eastern provinces undermine the resources of their native communities inasmuch as the newly minted senators had to move their persons and properties to the New Rome, but the creation of an imperial senate there also meant that those aristocrats in the East who had been members of Old Rome’s senate were forced to quit the Tiber for the Hellespont, a development that adversely impacted on the institution that perhaps its most outstanding representative characterized—and not self-consciously at all—as “the better part of the human race” (Symmachus, Epistulae, i.52). Not only did the Constantinopolitan senate come to rival what had been the monopoly of deliberative authority exercised so long by its ancient counterpart at Rome but, concurrently, the establishment of an imperial curia also seriously undercut the independence of the provincial élites in the eastern half of the empire. Little wonder, then, that there was resentment of and resistance on the part of conservative, if not reaction-ary, critics like Libanius and Julian, reactions directed personally toward Themistius himself, whose adlection stirred up a firestorm of protest from his professional and confessional colleagues that he sought to rebut in the first of a series of apologetic orations (Ors. 23, 24, and 26).

Yet, as “one of the most prominent propagators of political Hellenism,” Themistius was on what proved to be the winning side of history. His admission into and promotion of a senatorial order created and enhanced by imperial favor was part-and-parcel of what otherwise could be legitimately called a modernization process initiated by the Diocletianic tetrarchy and quickened during the Constantinian dynasty. As Peter Heather has noted—in refreshing contrast to the stale interpretations still too current concerning that development as “die Ausrottung den Besten” about “the decline of the curial classes [in the fourth century] consequent upon the shift of financial and political power towards the imperial center”:

The main political problem [facing an empire the size of Rome’s with only the most primitive communications], therefore, was how to manage devolution without generating fragmentation . . . This extension of central state structures [the equivalent of Hopkins’ ‘differentiated institutions’] cer-
tainly impinged upon the autonomy of cities, but did so in ways which fostered political unity. . . . The creation of new patronage networks, which tied local landowning élites more closely to the imperial center, thus marks, contrary to more traditional views, no obvious decline in the socio-political organization of the later Roman empire.\textsuperscript{31}

In his own career—a veritable case study of social mobility—Themistius was, of course, both an earliest beneficiary of and the strongest advocate for a fundamental reconfiguration of the Roman state and society wherein, according to Heather, “the real story of the fourth century lies.”\textsuperscript{32} The roles played—and scripted—in that drama were as much comfortable as crucial in its outcome, namely, the centralization as well as rationalization of the emperor’s primacy in early Byzantine society. For Themistius, unlike contemporary public intellectuals like Libanius, was neither jealous of local traditions nor envious of imperial ambitions. His own social circumstances and intellectual convictions jointly predisposed him to sharing in and working for Constantine’s vision of the capital on the Bosphorus which his son sought to realize (20d-21a).

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the Constantii oratio—a primary source too often neglected for presumably being too negligible in substance as well as style—in terms of Hopkins’ model of élite mobility certainly suggests, then, that the imperial message requesting (and, in effect, requiring) Themistius’ admission into the senatorial order was neither as superficial in content nor as inconsequential in context as conventional scholarship rather dismissively presumed. Indeed, the text itself, when read as a historical document from a theoretical perspective, is revealed as valuable and valid evidence of a significant transformation of the world of Late Antiquity. Thus, testimony that had been not so much previously unavailable as rashly unappreciated and sorely underestimated could be used to explain and explicate how and why social mobility worked to achieve consensus rather than conflict as the mode of imperial government.

It was a process, of course, that involved two parties. On the one hand, there was Themistius’ biography; on the other, Constantius’ policy. And both, as already argued, could be profitably analyzed according to the three features Hopkins attributed to “Élite Mobility in the Roman Empire.”
Thus, Themistius’ own rise in distinction from professor to proconsul could be interpreted more accurately and acutely as a career path, itself a typology of élite mobility, that coincided with as well as paralleled, appropriately enough, if not “the birth, then the rise of the senate of Constantinople, a development which constitutes an important chapter in the political and social history of an era already rich in changes of all kinds.”

This same analytical framework also promises dividends in exploring other aspects not only of the scholar-official whose adlection meant the substitution of “Roman dignitas for Greek sophia” (Con.or, 21a) but also of his first imperial patron, a man whose reign has been unfairly as well as unfavorably overshadowed by a predecessor who was a prodigy (his father, Constantine the Great) and his successor who became a celebrity (his cousin, Julian the Apostate). For inasmuch as historical research wedded to a theoretical construct seems, in this instance, to have worked well, there is the probability that revisiting other issues might likewise result in the reward of further revisions of the record.

NOTES

1. Constantius’ communication (Dêmegoria Kônstantiou Autokratoros pros tén synklêton hyper Thêmistiou: 18c-23d) is in: Wilhelm Dindorf, ed., Themistii orationes (Hildesheim, repr. 1961 of 1832 ed.) 21-27, and G. Downey and A. F. Norman, eds., Themistii orationes quae supersunt III (BT; Leipzig, 1974), 121-128. The translations used herein are the author’s.


3. Ibid.


7. Ibid., 165.


12-26.

10. Ibid., 20.


12. Ibid.


15. Ibid., 20.

16. Ibid., 22.


22. This is the hypothesis of F. Schemmel (“Die Hochschule von Konstantinopel im IV. Jahrhundert,” Neue Jahrblücher für Pedaqoqik 22 (1908): 153).


25. Ibid. Note Hopkins’ well-taken caveat (p. 15) against the tendency of many modern historians of the Roman Empire to underestimate, pace the overwhelming testimony of the primary sources themselves, the intensity as well as resilience of “the tension or conflict primarily between the emperor and the aristocracy and secondarily between each of those two and the structurally differentiated institutions.”

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 15.


31. Ibid.