Carl Frederick Wittke, 13 November 1892 - 24 May 1971

Dean Wittke served as president of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association in 1940-41. He devoted massive energy and courage in fighting on behalf of the American Association of University Professors, particularly as chairman of its famous Committee “A” on Academic Freedom and Tenure at a time when professorial tenure was no more than an aspiration. In the 1950’s he was noted for his articulate opposition to non-Communist oaths and the blight of McCarthyism. In 1951 he stated that non-Communist oaths were useless in any form and warned that some congressional investigations were doing little to safeguard liberty. He asserted that democracy would die of creeping paralysis if its public servants were forced to work in the “poisonous atmosphere of constant suspicion and surveillance.”

He took these stands on behalf of the scholar’s privilege to follow truth wherever it may lead, and for the student’s right to learn and to make up his own mind. He took these stands because he knew, in a democracy, that liberty without learning is always in peril and that learning without liberty is always in vain.

Dean Wittke’s continuing and close relations with the problems of both students and faculty narrowed the divisive chasm that so often separates teachers and administrators throughout the American educational system. In spite of heavy demands on his time he taught at least one course each semester. In recent years he often said that his pride in the accomplishment of former students exceeded the very real satisfactions he gained from numerous publications. For his students, this was a high tribute indeed.

Whether he spoke or wrote or acted, the approach was rational and humanistic. He was steadfast and courageous in controversies involving basic principles and standards, but was never known to raise his voice or to dip his pen in vitriol. His essential faith was that in the long run the achievement of knowledge would result in a comparatively happy and meaningful existence for those who sought it, a much more happy and meaningful existence than that experienced by those who pass their days in ignorance. His essential religion was to be as kindly, to the living and to the dead, as he could possibly be — and he was frank to admit that from time to time his heart overruled his head. Because of his stress on virtue, endurance, and self-discipline—his death marks the passing of a twentieth-century Stoic.

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Sir William Paget and the Protectorate, 1547-1549

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Following the death of Henry VIII in 1547, Sir William Paget advanced to a position of influence held by no Tudor statesman since the fall of Thomas Cromwell. Paget, an administrator and diplomat of long experience, became confidential adviser to Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset and Lord Protector. His standing with the Protector allowed him to give detailed and often critical advice about a wide range of foreign and domestic policies. This paper examines Paget's correspondence with Somerset between 1547 and 1549 and shows him to be a practical and tough-minded conservative possessed of great insight into the operation of Tudor government. Unfortunately, Somerset failed to heed most of Paget's advice, perhaps not so much because it was unsound, but because the lofty Protector could not stomach unpleasant truths. Although Paget's career cost him his position, it was Somerset who suffered the greater fall when he was toppled from power in October, 1549.

Paget has long been recognized as one of the most important Crown officials of the early Tudor period but has received less attention from historians than contemporaries such as Cromwell, William Petre, and Thomas Smith. One of the few major figures to survive the perils of Reformation politics, he held high office under Henry VIII, Edward VI and Mary, retiring only after the accession of Elizabeth. In 1900, A. F. Pollard described Paget as a man "of great ability and untiring industry" and added that he knew "the inner workings" of Henry VIII's mind "as no other man knew them." More recently W. K. Jordan wrote in Edward VI: The Young King that Paget was "possibly the most able and certainly the most gifted of all the members" of Edward's government. The only detailed study of Paget's career is "Master of Practises, A Life of William, Lord Paget of Beaudesert, 1506-1563," a doctoral dissertation by S. R. Gammon. Because Gammon's important work remains unpublished, the only scholarly account readily available is William A. J. Archbold's article in the Dictionary of National Biography.

The Tudor dynasty faced its greatest political crisis in 1547 when the throne passed to Edward VI, a child of nine years. The danger of a royal minority was all too well known in the sixteenth century, for men remembered the bad old days of the Lancastrians and Yorkists. Strong leadership was especially necessary to steer the English ship of state through the tempests of the Reformation. Whatever his vices may have been, Henry VIII was a titan among kings, and his role could not be filled by a mere child. In the past the minorities of Richard II, Henry VI, and Edward V had ushered in political instability caused by a struggle for power among royal cousins and over-great magnates. It was not unreasonable to expect a repetition of these miseries in 1547.

Tudor government, like that of the Lancastrians and Yorkists, provided no remedy for a royal minority. A mature and able King was required to provide leadership and stability. The English aristocracy lacked the experience and probably the political competence to conduct the affairs of state without royal initiative. They understood rebellion and practiced the more primitive forms of factionalism, but most of them were strangers to the conduct of responsible government. The concept of a constitutional or loyal opposition was over a century away. Law and order had prevailed for nearly four decades because Henry VIII inherited a secure throne and learned to manage the political and religious factions within his council with ruthless genius. In contrast, the King's brother-in-law, Somerset, with no royal blood to sustain his power, rose from the ranks of the council to a vulnerable position as Lord Protector which required him to exercise royal authority without divine sanction.

In the final analysis Henry VIII failed to provide for the future. His aggressive foreign policy left England on the brink of bankruptcy. In spite of six marriages, he was childless, and had two daughters whose legitimacy was open to question. His only political legacy was his last will and testament, recently the subject of great controversy. This will called for government by a regency council of equals, but excluded one formidable Henrician figure, Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester. Given the experiences of the past, it was indeed doubtful whether such a council could provide the country with effective government.

Such distressing thoughts about the future hardly could have escaped Paget as the King lay dying at Westminster on January 28. During these last hours of Henry's life, Paget walked in the gallery with Seymour, then Earl of Hertford, discussing the problems of the new reign. According to Paget, the two decided upon a protectorate in which Hertford assumed full power, but agreed to follow Paget's advice in all matters "more than any other man's." A personal compact was formed whereby Hertford, uncle to the young Edward, might benefit from Paget's experience in government. The decision to form a protectorate under Hertford was obviously contrary to the terms of Henry's will, and consequently, Paget and Hertford decided that only parts of the document would be made public immediately. Hertford asked Paget to tell Parliament only which men were named executors and members of the new council. Later the two would meet and "agree therein as there may be no controversy hereafter."

The King's death was officially announced to Parliament on January 31, at which time Paget read select portions of the will. Later the same day the executors met and agreed upon the creation of the Protectorate. Some historians have described this act by Hertford, Paget, and their allies in the council as a coup d'état. If "a sudden exercise of force whereby an existing government is subverted" or "an unexpected stroke of policy" are acceptable definitions of a coup, it is doubtful whether the phrase accurately explains the events of 1547. Hertford clearly did not employ force to make himself Protector. Nor did he subvert an existing government, for the council of equals called for by the will existed only on paper. The leadership of any potential opposition, Gardiner or the Duke of Norfolk, had al-
ready been removed by Henry VIII. Moreover, nothing could have been more expected. Those familiar with recent English history knew there were precedents for one man rule during a royal minority. Indeed, rule by a council of equals was more alien to the English constitution than a protectorate. The aged Imperial ambassador, Eustace Chapuys, writing from retirement in Louvain, and his earnest, but mediocre successor, Van der Delft, saw the direction events were moving before learning of the King’s death. The decision of Hertford and Paget in the gallery then was neither sinister nor diabolical; rather it was a practical solution to the problem of Edward’s minority.

Later Paget played a leading role in the distribution of rewards to Edward’s councillors. Paget and Sir Anthony Denny and Sir William Herbert, both gentlemen of the late King’s privy chamber, were requested to declare Henry’s intentions. Paget stated that the King “devised with me apart (as it is well known he used to open his pleasure to me alone in many things)” for disposing of lands belonging to the Duke of Norfolk and his son, Surrey. Henry asked Paget to prepare a book listing those who should be favored. Hertford was to become Lord Treasurer and Earl Marshal and be given the title Duke of Somerset, Exeter, or Hertford. He was also to receive lands worth 1000 marks per year. Other councilors were to be similarly rewarded and advanced in rank. The King commanded Paget to publicize these grants, “but before this could be achieved, God took him from us.” Denny and Herbert confirmed Paget’s testimony, and consequently, the Protector and council proceeded to carry out the late King’s wishes.

Paget received no peerage, but was rewarded with a legacy of £ 300. He was reappointed one of the King’s two principal secretaries along with Sir William Petre, who was regarded as junior to Paget. In May, Paget was installed as Knight of the Garter. It was probably during June or July that he relinquished the secretarialship, which he had held since 1543, to become controller of the King’s household. The reasons for this change are not clear. The secretarialship had declined in importance after the fall of Thomas Cromwell and came to rank below the controller, who was one of three leading household officers. Paget’s appointment as controller was then a promotion, and it may have been intended to free him from routine duties so that he could devote more attention to higher level policy making.

That Paget held a position of great influence with the Protector during the first months of the new reign is supported by a variety of sources. In February Ambassador Van der Delft observed that the leading men were Somerset, Paget, Thomas William Petre, Earl of Southampton, and John Dudley, Earl of Warwick. He believed that Somerset and Warwick would have the “honors and titles of rulers,” but Paget and Southampton would in reality have “the entire management of affairs.” Two days later Van der Delft was convinced that Paget was “the person most in authority.” Paget assured the ambassador that just before Henry’s death the King “informed him of all things; he passed the entire week speaking to him alone; they passing entire nights in conversation together.” According to Paget, it was at his request that the Earl of Hertford was called to the King’s bedside. Then the three, Henry, Hertford, and Paget, conferred for several hours before the other councillors were summoned. Van der Delft was not always a reliable reporter of the Edwardian political scene, but his estimate of Paget’s position can scarcely be questioned. At one point he wrote that Somerset was acting entirely on the advice and counsel of Paget. Paget’s personal influence with the Protector obviously gave him a leading role in the conduct of government business. He was not merely a clever administrator working in the wings; he was sharing the spotlight with the Protector during the first months of the new regime.

The once-powerful Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, felt the sting of Paget’s authority. After Henry’s death, Gardiner, as well as the other bishops, had to renew their commissions. To do this they applied to Secretary Paget, who held the seal ad causas ecclesiasticas, the symbol of royal control over the Church. Gardiner disliked the form of the commission and asked Paget for amendments. Paget’s reply shows exactly how far Gardiner’s prestige had fallen. In unequivocal terms he informed Gardiner, “Your lordship shall have your commission in as ample manner as I have authority to make out the same; and in an ampler manner than you had it before, which I think you may execute now with less fear of danger than you have had cause hitherto to do. No man wishes you better than I do, which is as well as to myself; if you wish me not like, you are in the wrong.” Paget defended himself against charges of usurping power and warned Gardiner that he must comply with all religious reforms.

The death of Henry VIII raised a multitude of questions about the future course of English policy. Those who expected the Protectorate to be a period of consolidation and inactivity could not have been more in error; for Somerset lost no time in showing that he intended to give the country dynamic leadership. In September he invaded Scotland with an army of 18,000 and won an overwhelming victory at Pinkie. The conquest of Scotland had been an English goal for centuries, but in the past England had lacked the will and the resources required for permanent subjugation. Furthermore, the Scots could always depend on the assistance of England’s historic enemy, France. Whereas Henry VIII had followed up his Scottish victories with nothing more than devastating raids, Somerset sought to garrison large parts of the defeated country. While this was an intelligent strategy, it also ran the risk of French intervention and undermined England’s already shaky finances. An aggressive foreign policy was always popular and exciting until the time came to pay the bills. Henry VIII had been troubled by delusions of grandeur about England’s position among the European powers, and it would appear that Somerset was stricken with the same malady.

The Protector’s first Parliament, which met after his triumph in Scotland, initiated both secular and ecclesiastical reforms. An act repealing the most oppressive features of the Henrician treason legislation brought Somerset great favor from the country, but Parliament did not respond to his benevolence by providing adequate financial support for his foreign policy. Also repealed was the Act of Six Ar-
ticles, the most effective instrument of the Henrician religious reaction. The institution of communion in both kinds for the laity troubled conservative churchmen and foreshadowed the full-blown Protestant program of 1549. Somerset's liberalism brought him well-deserved popularity, but his experiments in religious innovation demanded a realistic assessment of the country's spiritual inclinations. The great majority of Englishmen remained Catholic and had been little affected by Reformers such as Archbishop Cranmer, who were active at the court of Henry VIII. While many were opposed to religious changes for any reason whatsoever, others believed that Henrician settlement should remain intact at least until Edward VI came of age.22

As the Protectorate began to encounter difficulties in achieving its objectives, Sir William Paget became the most influential exponent of moderation and political realism. Perhaps better than any other man in the Protector's council, Paget understood the limitations of politics, or in more modern terms, the simple fact that politics is the art of the possible. He lacked the vision and enthusiasm of a creative man, but his wisdom made him an apostle of common sense. In 1547 he undoubtedly agreed with Gardiner who, advised the Protector to "let the Scots be Scots" until Edward VI was mature enough to conduct his own foreign policy.23 In March, Paget, Warwick, Lord Russell, and Thomas, Lord Seymour negotiated a defensive league with France. Henry VIII's conquest of Boulogne left the French eager for revenge. Their opportunities for retaliation against England included attacks on Boulogne, harassment of the English garrison at Calais, and intervention in Scotland. The defensive alliance with Francis I, which included an agreement on the boundaries of Boulogne, was definitely a move in the right direction, but on March 31, Francis died and was succeeded by his son Henry II, who refused ratification.24

Paget was anything but dazzled by Somerset's victories in Scotland and saw very clearly the lurking dangers. At Candlemas, February 2, 1548, he sent the first of several remembrances or letters of advice to the Protector.25 Paget's forthrightness shows that he unquestionably enjoyed the fullest confidence of Somerset; he was a councillor who held a unique position and was bold enough to exploit it to the utmost. Paget advised Somerset "to pass over this summer without new fortifications and by your good wisdom and experience to appoint such a number of horsemen and footmen to serve for the North." Fortresses in Scotland may have opened the way to total conquest, but they also served to provoke French intervention. Consequently, Paget recommended that Somerset should tread lightly and follow more in the footsteps of Henry VIII; he should, said Paget, content himself to "waste the country." He also thought the navy should be placed in a better state of readiness. The Lord Admiral should give order "for the description of two or three thousand mariners; I mean," Paget explained, "not to give them any pret, but to cause a view to be taken of so many and billing their names in writing to charge them not to be out of the way and a like description to be made of a like number of soldiers in such places as where they may be best taken to furnish the ships." Caution and preparedness were the watchwords of Paget in the midst of winter when there was ample time for serious reassessment of English foreign policy.

Paget's appraisal of the situation was only too correct. As Professor Wernham has observed, "Somerset's Scottish policy had thus precipitated the very danger that it was designed to avert.26 For the Scots Henry II's proposal that Mary, their young Queen, should marry his son and heir was more attractive than Somerset's scheme for marrying her to Edward VI. "They knew well enough that a united Great Britain was not likely to make Edinburgh its capital.27 Although the French had recaptured St. Andrews Castle before Somerset's invasion, the full force of their intervention was not felt until six thousand troops arrived in June, 1548. At the ruined Abbey of Haddington the Scots accepted the French marriage treaty and promptly sealed the bargain by permitting their Queen to take up residence in France. Meanwhile, a combined Franco-Scottish army besieged the English position at Haddington.

In an attempt to relieve Haddington an English force led by Sir Thomas Palmer and Sir Robert Bowes was annihilated and the two commanders captured." Palmer, who was executed in 1553 for his role in the Northumberland conspiracy, was a close friend of Paget.28 His capture prompted Paget to write a most critical letter to the Protector. "I loved the man in particular friendship," said Paget, "we have provoked him too much forward with letters accusing his stillness, slackness, and slovenliness without doing anything," Paget then turned to Somerset's execution of his high office as Lord Protector. He reminded him that "you supply the place of a King" and as such his words had great authority over subordinates like Palmer, who took unnecessary risks out of a strong sense of loyalty. "I am loth to offend your grace," wrote Paget, "glad to please you, and desirous to tell you the truth because I believe you trust me."

Protector Somerset pushed forward with his domestic reforms in spite of reversals in Scotland and French hostility. In June, 1548, he issued a proclamation condemning enclosures. Parliament had declined to legislate on this highly inflammable question the previous year as might have been expected from an assembly dominated by landlords. Somerset's championship of the anti-enclosure movement constitutes his chief claim to fame as a social reformer, but from the beginning his efforts were hindered by powerful vested interests. Early in 1548 Archbishop Cranmer, with the support of Somerset, began to prepare the English church for changes in the celebration of the mass. When Parliament met in November, 1548, there were heated debates over the new doctrine of the Eucharist, which was embodied in Cranmer's first Book of Common Prayer.

While Parliament was in the midst of its debate over religion, Paget wrote a letter to Somerset that can be interpreted only as a comprehensive indictment of the Protectorate.29 On Christmas Day, 1548, Paget implored Somerset to look backward, whether at your first setting forward you took not a wrong way saving your favor I think you did; or you have cared to content all men (which is impossible and specially being subjects in such a subjection as they were left) and be loth or rather afraid to offend any. Extremities be never good, and for my part I have
always hated them naturally to which in our old master's
time (I speak with reverence and in the loyalty of a true
heart to my sovereign lord that was and that now is) and
to which in our master's time that now is hath and doth
hurt. Then all things were straight and now they are
too loose; then was it dangerous to do or speak though
the meaning were not evil, and now every man hath lib-
erty to do and speak at liberty without danger. What are
and were? May then the prince thought it not convenient for the subject to judge or to dispute or
talk of the sovereign his matters and had learned of his
father to keep them in due obedience by the administra-
tion of justice under the law and now the ministers of
the prince dislike not that every man judge and dispute
of their doings upon 'supposist' that all men shall be
pleased.

Paget thus agreed with modern historians who spoke of
Tudor despotism under Henry VIII. He was also critical
of the Protector's enthusiasm for religious reform. In Paget's opinion, the most pressing need of
the country was additional tax revenue, not religious
innovation. Indeed Paget said most people expected a subsidy to be the Protector's first request to
Parliament. This was the only reason for summoning
Parliament before Christmas. He further added that
Seymour was one of the council from foreign affairs so they might better assist him "for
the oversight of the whole in general." Paget left
little doubt that he favored closer consultation
between Somerset and his colleagues in the council, for
these men were as devoted as Somerset to the welfare
of the Commonwealth and could provide valuable as-
sistance in conducting the King's government. Paget
was obviously disappointed with the Protector's poli-
cies, yet he held out hope that improvement was possible if Somerset would only heed his advice.

A week later Paget took the extraordinary step
of sending the Protector a formal discourse on the
conduct of affairs of state. Sent as a New Year's gift,
this "schedule" instructed Somerset in a manner that
can be compared only to a lesson given to a schoolboy
by his master. Paget explained that "because the
determination to renew gifts of the New Year was
sudden, I could not prepare such a New Year's gift
for your grace as the fashion of the world required.
Yet considering the favor of your grace to be special
towards me, ... I thought it best to send your grace
though no rich gift, yet a token of my heart
which wishes both this and all other years hereafter
happiness and luck unto you." "My token," said Pa-
et, "is this schedule here enclosed wherein as in a
glass if your grace will daily look and by it make
you ready, you shall so well apparel yourself as each
man shall delight to behold you." Whereas Paget's
earlier letters had dealt with specific matters of poli-
icy, his tone became philosophical or even professor-
ial. The lofty Lord Protector of England was told
by his councillor that he must deliberate maturely
in all things and even quickly in deliberations.
He must do justice to all without respect for a man's
position. In the conduct of government the Protec-
tor should consult with "assured and staid wise
men." Moreover, he must follow their advice in
council; and if he does all these things "God will
prosper you, the King will favor you, and all men
love you." If he strays from these, then he should
avoid the conclusion that Paget believed
Somerset had not even mastered the rudiments of
government. Paget, like Sir Thomas Elyot in The
Boke named the Governor, wrote "to the intent that
men ... will be studious about the weale publike." There was but one difference: Elyot was an educator
of children, whereas Paget addressed the most pow-
erful statesman in England.

The new year, 1549, did not favor the Protector-
ate as Paget had hoped. On the contrary, it was a
year of violent political and social upheaval. Somer-
set's prestige was first of all sabotaged by a senseless
family quarrel. His brother, Thomas, Lord Seymour,
a rash and irresponsible man, was the prisoner of
many vices, not least of which was an overpowering
lust for women. Had he contemted himself with in-
ocent young maidens or the experienced ladies of
the court, he would have been remembered primarily
as a romantic adventurer; but when his eye turned
to the royal family, he became a positive menace.
Seymour's interests included Henry VIII's two daugh-
ters, Mary and Elizabeth, as well as his wife,
Queen Catherine Parr. Diverted from the royal
princesses, Seymour married Queen Catherine in
"indecent haste" shortly after Henry's death. The
Protector was scandalized by his brother's behavior,
and as brotherly love soured into hatred, the Earl of
Warwick made a futile attempt to bring about a
reconciliation. Seymour and Catherine, believing
themselves slighted by the Protector, placed their
hopes in Catherine's bastard child, who should some-
how avenge the wrongs committed against its par-
tents. But, as was so frequently the case in the six-
teenth century, neither Catherine nor her son surviv-
ed childbirth. Not one to linger in mourning, Sey-
mour quickly renewed his suit for Elizabeth, plotted
to gain influence over the King, his nephew, and
intrigued against his brother. In January, the coun-
cell committed him to the Tower; and he was subse-
quently attainted and executed for high treason.
Paget prepared a memorandum for Somerset remi-
him to make necessary preparations for imprisoning
Seymour and his accomplices," but it appears that
his role in the affair was that of a councillor, neither
more nor less.

If Paget's earlier advice to Somerset tended to-
ward pessimism, he soon became an outright pro-
phet of doom. Indeed, in February, before the att-
tinder of Seymour, Paget feared he was becoming
a Cassandra. He begged the Protector to:

... weigh and ponder my writing again and again, and
make me not to be a Cassandra, who tells men what
the truth is, and would be told the truth of dangers before and was not believed; sorry would I be to live to be such a one. But your grace
day may much that I be not such a one. And now, Sir,
let your eyes look and see what you stand and look not
near at hand only, but also afoot and far off.

Paget did more than utter a cry of anguish. In this
letter, as well as in others, he showed a remarkable
grasp of the realities of Tudor politics, and it is dif-
cult to fault his analysis on a single issue. He knew
full well that finance was the key to all the problems
of the Protectorate. "We have no money at all to
speak of in a King's case," Paget said; and he quoted
an old saying that "it is evil having a lord's heart and
a beggar's purse together." To deal with the finan-
cial crisis he recommended Sir Edward Wootton and
Sir Walter Mildmay. Thus he not only lamented the
state of the realm and diagnosed problems, but also
suggested positive remedies.

It was crystal clear to Paget, if not to Somerset,
that a shortage of money prevented a dynamic for-
eign policy. In Scotland peace was the only realistic alternative. As Paget put it, the Scots wanted "liberty not domination by England."59 France had grown too strong to be resisted singlehandedly; consequently he wished Somerset to feign friendship with the Emperor. To appease Charles, Somerset could argue that only the form, not the substance of Religion had been changed. If the matter were well debated, the Emperor might be convinced. If not Somerset could at least dally and gain time, and in Paget’s opinion "time bringeth forth many things."60

Paget’s competence was by no means limited to the orthodox questions of finance and diplomacy, for he also had a keen understanding of the social basis of effective government. Machiavelli had not discovered that it was more important for a ruler to be feared and respected than loved by his people. This was a lesson that all successful statesmen had mastered. Since the formation of the Protectorate, Paget observed that "the greater officers were not greatly feared, the people presuming much of their goodness. Throughout England the common people were "too liberal in speech, too bold and licentious in their doings and too wise and well learned in their own conceits."61 What was required was rigorous enforcement of all laws, a policy that would result in obedience, "which now is clean gone." Paget obviously recalled Henry VIII’s memorable last speech to Parliament when he told Somerset, "We shall no more say thou Papist and thou heretic, for your law the last year for the sacrament and this year for the ceremonies will help much the matter if they be well executed."62 Both Paget and Somerset had entered political life under Henry VIII and were therefore students of the same master. But it was Paget alone who understood that easy popularity was no substitute for effective control over the unruly masses.

Not until the end of March did Paget give any hint that his role as confidential adviser to Somerset might be in jeopardy. On the 21st he wrote, "I have been informed that your grace has conceived some displeasure towards me ..." The dispute concerned Paget’s activities at the close of Parliament, but details are unfortunately lacking. Although Parliament passed the first Act of Uniformity, Somerset encountered strong opposition to his social legislation in the House of Commons;63 and he may have had differences with Paget. Earlier Paget had begged Somerset to end Parliament as soon as possible. He thought Parliament should have been ended before Christmas, "for then your grace should have had leisure in the dead time of the year, which is now past, in making acts not so necessary but they might have been deferred till a more quiet time to provide for the things that shall be needful in summer."64 Whatever the problem may have been, Paget had heard that Somerset’s wife was his accuser, but subsequently learned, much to his pleasure, that this was not true. Paget, however, was convinced that he had enemies who were envious of his position and sought to discredit him with the Protector.65

At the end of March, when Paget received the first inkling of Somerset’s disfavor, there was no reason to believe that the Protectorate would collapse within six months. In spite of the execution of his brother, Somerset remained as firmly at the helm as he had been a year before. By speaking out in unequivocal terms, Paget undoubtedly endangered his career. A man of less integrity would have played at flattery or at least sugar-coated his advice to make it more palatable. The extent to which other members of the council shared his critical views about the Protector’s policies is not clear. Sir Thomas Smith, who became the second secretary in 1548, advised Somerset against debasing the coinage in June and probably wrote the critical social treatise, A Discourse of the Commonweal of England, about the same time.66 On the other hand, as late as July, Warwick was still writing friendly letters to Sir John Thynne, Somerset’s steward, the man whom Paget later cited as a primary cause of the Protector’s unpopularity.67 Warwick apparently did not fully commit himself to opposing Somerset, his life-long friend, until September when he returned from Norfolk after defeating Robert Kett.68 By the end of the summer, the failures of the Protectorate were self-evident, and one did not have to be a sage to offer criticism. Paget, however, had stood at Somerset’s right hand since Henry VIII lay dying, and he gave honest advice that would have permitted Somerset to change his policies months before his friends and enemies were forced to risk civil war in order to deprive him of his power.

When Somerset was overthrown by the council, his former colleagues charged him with despotism and with refusing to accept the advice of other experienced councillors.69 In October this line of argument sounded all too much like the special pleading of a faction that had grown jealous of his power, and to some historians the charges against Somerset were little more than the cant of grasping and self-seeking individuals.70 Consequently, Paget’s growing concern about Somerset’s use of his vast power is of particular importance. In July, 1548, Paget had reminded the Protector that he supplied the place of a King and must exercise his authority with great care.71 At Christmas he recommended that councillors should be allowed to work more closely with Somerset and that he should listen carefully to the opinions of others before making a decision.72 Paget’s didactic New Year’s ‘schedule’ included the suggestion that Somerset should give commissions in the King’s name when he was attending to the King’s causes.73 He obviously felt Somerset was exposing himself to unnecessary danger by assuming a royal posture. As Somerset discovered too late, his position had been created by his peers, and it could also be abolished.

On several occasions Paget recommended specific persons for governmental matters which required careful attention. As shown above, he named Wotton and Mildmay as men who could devise financial reforms. In March, 1549, he asked Somerset to dispatch Warwick and Lord Russell to the North and West, respectively. In the same letter Paget indicated that he himself might be capable of greater responsibility. He would go anywhere, "to the north, east, west, or south," if he might better serve Somerset and his country.74 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Paget felt Somerset was concentrating too much power in his own hands. The council included men whose experience in government was as great as Somerset’s, and commonsense dictated that the country should make fullest possible use of its talent.
The notion that Somerset was growing despotic was no longer implied or couched in subtlety in Paget's letter of May 8. He said quite bluntly that the duke must debate more willingly with his colleagues and “hear them again graciously,” or “your grace shall have first cause to repent.” Affairs were reaching a point where “no man shall dare speak to you what he thinks.” Paget conceded that Somerset listened to him “very gently” out of council, but seldom acted on his advice. According to Paget, at least one adviser had been reduced to weeping as a result of Somerset’s harsh treatment. He reminded the Protector that if in times past a king or cardinal had spoken to him in this way, “it would have pricked you at the stomach.” “If I knew not certainly how much men of service that have to do with your grace be troubled withall,” said Paget, “I would never write this much.” Paget knew that successful statemanship demanded more than the formulation and execution of policy; it also included a human dimension. A ruler needed to manage his advisers skillfully so they would feel free to voice their honest opinions without fear of reprisal. No man could govern by himself, and he who rode roughshod over his councillors did so at his peril.

In one respect at least Somerset responded to the mountains of advice he received. In June he sent Paget to the Emperor with instructions to reaffirm Anglo-Imperial unity, to negotiate the marriage of Princess Mary to the Infant of Portugal, and to seek assistance against France. It is difficult in retrospect to decide whether Somerset had serious hopes that these objectives could be achieved or whether he merely wanted to free himself from the meddlesome Paget. England was scarcely the major diplomatic concern of Charles V, whose interests were in Germany where the recently defeated Lutheran princes were growing restive. Located on the periphery of the Reformation political arena, heretical England could not expect to command much attention from a Holy Roman Emperor who was intent on restoring Catholicism in central Europe. What the Protector needed was Imperial support against the highly vulnerable frontier of Boulogne. The other prerequisite for successful diplomacy was missing, for England had little or nothing of value to contribute to the bargain.

Although his own appraisal of the situation is not known, Paget set to work quickly after arriving in Brussels on June 19. He was received agreeably by the Emperor’s officials, and on the 22nd, Paget and Sir Philip Hoby were granted an audience by Charles himself. Paget’s line of argument was that Henry II of France was reserving the greatest part of his forces at home in anticipation of the Emperor’s death. Perhaps because he realized the weakness of his position, Paget wrote to Secretary Petre on the 24th for additional directions. He explained that he wanted “a quick dispatch for these folk here, as they use no delays, so they look for speedy answers.” After considering the Emperor’s attitude, Paget was prepared to accept a realistic compromise. He thought that if the Emperor would agree to confirm the treaty of 1543, his friendship could be relied on. However, if Charles went further and promised to protect Boulogne, in spite of its “doubtful position in regard to an attack,” he was undoubtedly planning war with the French “in regard of his own affairs,” and would proceed accordingly regardless of England’s action. Unfortunately, the speedy answers that Paget wanted from Somerset and the council were not forthcoming. On July 4 the council requested Paget to hesitate since it had learned that the French had appointed commissioners to discuss the boundary questions at Boulogne. In the event that Paget had become troubled about affairs at home, the council sought to put his mind at ease by stating that the revolts in Devon, Hampshire, Kent, and Essex were nearly suppressed.

The council, of course, grossly underestimated the importance of the uprisings which extended from Cornwall to Norfolk. In the West there was a violent opposition to the new Book of Common Prayer, while in Norfolk the commons were motivated by a variety of economic grievances. If Paget’s letters are a reliable guide to his thoughts, he was deeply troubled, indeed almost despondent, over the news and was altogether impressed by the council’s disclaimers. On July 7, he reminded Somerset of their agreement in the gallery when Henry VIII lay dying and accused him of failing to keep his promise. He laid the blame for the revolts squarely at the feet of the Protector. On many occasions Somerset had not only ignored Paget’s advice, but over-ruled the “whole council.” “I know,” he said, “in this matter of the commons every man of the council has mislaid your proceedings.” At this point, Paget was, of course, being wise after the event; yet his pleas to Somerset were based on principles that he had supported since the establishment of the Protectorate. While Paget praised Somerset’s concern for the poor, he urged him to worry also about the King, himself, and his own family. The “new religion” was also at fault because, in Paget’s opinion, it was “not yet planted in the stomachs of the eleven of twelve parts in the realm.” Paget, from his distant post of Brussels, virtually demanded that Somerset revert to Henrician policy and restore law and order without delay. Given his absence from England, it is astounding that he was bold enough to specify in considerable detail the precise course Somerset should follow in putting down the rebellions and then add that he wished to be dismissed from the council, if his advice was not wanted. Paget further prophesied that Somerset would one day have to account for his actions and for the way he gained authority.

The troubles at home undeniably weakened Paget’s efforts to reach an agreement with the Emperor. Moreover, the council’s instructions to delay negotiations, while there was the possibility of a separate agreement with the French over Boulogne, hardly assisted him. It was not until July 22 that Paget acknowledged the total failure of his embassy. “As touching my proceedings here,” he wrote, “you may perceive the whole by our common letter, which indeed is nothing.” This letter contained Paget’s bitter denunciation of Sir John Thynne and concluded that England’s diplomatic problems could be solved only after peace was restored at home.

With the Emperor himself I have not treated but at my first coming, which in all this time of delay I would not have missed if your first determination there contained in mine instructions had continued; but all is for the best, and I trust for our benefit, if we may appease our things
at home, and lean not too much to such new fantasies as set forth innovations which be dangerous, and little known to the settlers forth what good or ill will come of
them. To alter the state of a realm would ask ten years'
deliberation.

Paget departed from Brussels troubled in body as
well as mind. He intended to return by the "long
seas," because he needed to purge himself "being
well farced with Rhenish wine."144

In the two months between his return and the
overthrow of the Protectorate, Paget played a rela-
tively minor role in government. His correspondence
gives the impression that he fell from Somerset's
high favor and no longer served as confidential ad-
viser.15 Somerset himself provided uninspiring lead-
ership to the country during the revolts in Devon
and Norfolk,16 rather military leaders like Warwick
and Russell seized the initiative and restored law and
order by force of arms. By the end of the summer
the policies of Somerset were wholly discredited,
and the charges made against him were almost identical
to the criticism contained in Paget's correspondence.17
The Protector's enemies did nothing more than take
over issues that had been raised by his friends. The
actual process by which the opposition within the
council developed is poorly documented, but it
appears that they did not unite to depose Somerset un-
til his policies had brought the country to the brink
of ruin.18

From the outset of the political crisis of October,
1549, Somerset's opponents held the upper hand. The
councillors who gathered in London included War-
wick, Southampton, St. John, Rich, Northampton,
and Arundel. Returning from a bloody victory in
the West, Russell and Herbert denied the Protector
the assistance of their veteran troops.19 The city of
London also threw its lot with the opposition.20 For
his part Somerset's greatest strength lay in the pos-
session of Edward VI, who was brought to Windsor.
Paget was his most valued supporter, but his allies
included Archbishop Cranmer, Sir Thomas Smith,
and Sir William Petre, who subsequently joined the
council in London.

When it became obvious that Somerset's cause
was hopeless, Paget worked to ensure the safety of
the young King and to assist in an orderly transfer
of power from the Protector to the council in London.
Although we do not have his own word on it, there
is the least doubt that Paget supported Somerset
out of personal loyalty rather than because he
agreed with his policies. Paget's allegiance was divided, for
he had friends among the opposition who entreated
him to bring Somerset to terms.21 In the very midst
of the crisis, the Duchess of Somerset wrote Paget
reminding him that he was her husband's friend and
councillor and begging him to assist him in his hour of
peril. "What hath my lord done to any of these
noble men or others," she asked, "that they should
disgrace and seek the extremity to him?" While it
is true that both Somerset and the Queen in London
spoke freely of possible violence during the early
stages of the revolt, each party later moved to a more
rational position.22 Thus, it is unlikely that either
was eager for bloodshed or civil war. Paget then
cannot claim credit for having singlehandedly brought
matters to a peaceful conclusion, but his efforts
undoubtedly made the capitulation of the

Protector less distasteful to his supporters and less
vexing to his enemies.

As confidential adviser to Somerset, Sir William
Paget was both a Henrician and a Cassandra. Paget,
the Henrician, remembered how Henry VIII had
maintained law and order during a reign that was
threatened by religious and social upheaval.23 Like
the late King, Paget was a realist who understood
the limitations of sixteenth century politics. He
realized that his countrymen were still Catholic at
heart and feared the flood of Protestant reforms
would encourage resistance from the ignorant
masses. Like conservatives of all ages, Paget be-
lieved the political process was infinitely complex
and preferred a government that moved slowly and
cautiously, if at all. Throughout his correspondence
with Somerset, he was consistent and unambiguous.
Somerset's determination to pursue different policies
show that Paget's logic and personal appeals were
not enough, and in the end he became a Cassandra,
merely a voice crying in the wilderness. Men of
Paget's stripe contributed mightily to the success of
Tudor government; they advised, administered, and
conducted diplomacy. What they lacked was the
power to put their policies into operation without
outside support. Edward Seymour, Duke of Som-
erset, was vested with the authority of Lord Protector
during the minority of Edward VI, and it was upon
his shoulders that responsibility for the conduct of
government rested. In the end Paget failed because
he could not overcome the limitations of his position.

Footnotes:

1. Professor Legacy Baldwin Smith and Howard S. Tanmuith Jr. were
kind enough to comment on earlier versions of this paper, one of which
was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Ohio Academy of History,
Columbus, Ohio, April 4, 1970. I would also like to acknowledge a
grant-in-aid from the American Philosophical Society which allowed
me to do research in England.

2. Most of Paget's correspondence with Somerset is contained in the Pa-
get Letter Book at the Northamptonshire Record Office. For further
details see R. L. Beers, "The Paget Letter Book," Manuscripts XIV
(1970), 176-78.


5. "Muster of Privy Counsellors," R. L. Beers, "The Last Will and
Testament of Edward VI: A Question of Perspective," Journal of Brit-
ish Studies (November 1958), 14-27, and M. Leesley, The Early Eliza-
abethan Councils, 1552-1556 (London 1960), 147-52.

6. P.L.B., July 7, 1549, Also Public Record Office, S.P. 10/9 No. 4, and
British Museum, Cotton MS. Titus IIII, fos. 27avr-27ev.

7. S.P. 10/6, 5, l.d. 29, 1549. Printed by P. F. Trench, England under

8. L. R. Smith, "The Lost Will and Testament of Henry VI: A Question

9. P.L.B., July 7, 1549. Also Public Record Office, S.P. 10/9 No. 4, and
British Museum, Cotton MS. Titus IIII, fos. 27avr-27ev.

10. S.P. 10/6, 5, l.d. 29, 1549. Printed by P. F. Trench, England under

1892-1894), VIII, 376, 385. Also Public Record Office, S.P. 10/6, 5,
I.d. 1522. Also Public Record Office, S.P. 10/6, 5, l.d. 15, 1549.


13. Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII,

319, 408-409.

C.S.P., Spn., IX, 19-20, February 10, 1547. For the early career of
Dudley see my article, "The Career of John Dudley, Duke of Northumber-

C.S.P., Spn., IX, 32-33, February 12, 1547.

C.S.P., Spn., IX, 32-33, February 12, 1547.

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Bicentennial of the American Revolution

In 1970 President Richard Smith appointed an Academy Committee on the Bicentennial Commemoration of the American Revolution. The members appointed at that time were John Cary, Chairman (Cleveland State University), Leon Bennis (Xavier), Bruce Stein (Ohio University), Carl Ubelhoh (Case Western Reserve), Richard Jellison (Miami), Don Gerlach (Akron), and David Skaggs (Bowling Green). The Committee has met twice and is considering the following projects:

1. The development of special programs on the American Revolution at Academy meetings in the Spring with a special program in 1975 or 1976.

2. The encouragement of colleges and universities in sponsoring institutes and workshops on the American Revolution for high school teachers.

3. The publication of a teacher's guide to printed and audio-visual materials dealing with the American Revolution.

4. A survey of manuscripts, printed, and filmed sources dealing with the American Revolution that are located in the state of Ohio.

The Committee will welcome suggestions on these or other appropriate Academy activities related to the Bicentennial.

John Cary, Chairman

Minutes of the Annual Meeting
Sherraton Motor Inn, Worthington, Ohio
Saturday, April 3, 1971

President Richard W. Smith called the business meeting to order at 1:25 P.M. and opened the meeting with a few remarks. He announced that the Fall Meeting would be held on October 15-18 at the University of Cincinnati with the University of Cincinnati and Xavier University as co-hosts. Professor Erving Beauregard, reporting for the Membership Committee, summarized their efforts this past year and indicated membership of more than 300. The Secretary-Treasurer gave the Treasurer's Report which showed a balance of $1,080.36 as of April 1, 1971, with funds outstanding of $494.68. He also read a brief necrology report noting the deaths of three longtime members of the Academy: Foster Rhea Dulles, William D. Overman, and Hastings Eells. Dulles won the book award twice and Overman and Eells were past presidents of the Academy.

Professor Dwight Smith (Miami) offered for the Nominating Committee the following slate of officers for 1971-72:

President—George W. Knepper (Akron)
Vice President—Erving E. Beauregard (Dayton)
Secretary-Treasurer—Carl G. Klopfenstein (Heidelberg)

No further nominations being presented from the floor, the nominations were closed, and the Secretary instructed to cast a unanimous ballot for the proposed slate. Professor Smith then submitted the names of William L. Fisk (Muskingum) and Hilmar G. Grinn (Capital) as nominees for the Executive Council. Professor Emily Geer (Findlay) was placed
in nomination from the floor. The balloting resulted in the election of Professor Geer to a three-year term on the Council.

President Smith next presented the incoming President, Dr. George Knepper, who delivered an interesting and enlightening address entitled, "Burgoyne for the Prosecution." Following the presidential address, Professor Arnold Schriner (Cincinnati) announced that the Distinguished Service Award Committee after due deliberation had decided to present three awards this year. The recipients were Professors Harris G. Warren (Miami), Clayton Ellsworth (Wooster) and Randolph Downes (Toledo).

President Smith introduced Mr. Daniel R. Porter, Director of the Ohio Historical Society, who spoke briefly on the new society facilities and their advantages. He expressed optimism in regard to the future and stated he looked forward to working more closely with the historical profession and its scholars. Professor Robert Jones (Case-Western Reserve) gave a brief report for the Standards Committee concerning new state certification standards for teachers of history and social studies.

Professor Kerr (Ohio State) presented the annual book award for the Publications Award Committee to Professor Jacob Marcus (Hebrew Union College) for his study, The Colonial American Jew. Following this award, President Smith offered a few concluding remarks and the meeting adjourned.

Respectfully submitted:
Carl G. Kloppenstein
Secretary-Treasurer

Report of the Standards Committee
April 3, 1971

Last fall the State Board of Education adopted new certification requirements that affect History and Social Studies. The new requirements are scheduled to go into effect January 1, 1972, and will have an impact not only upon the training of teachers but also upon college programs and presumably upon "standards." Rather briefly, the new state requirements contrast with the current ones by increasing the number of hours of college study required and by increasing the number of areas for certification.

Current certification requirements deal with a Social Studies Comprehensive Major composed of 45 semester or 68 quarter hours of course work, or a History and Government plan that included 27 semester or 41 quarter hours of work. The new plan includes Comprehensive Social Studies (60 s.h./90 q.h.); Humanities (60 s.h./90 q.h.); Economics (20 s.h./30 q.h.); Geography (20 s.h. or 30 q.h.); History (30 s.h./45 q.h.); Political Science (20 s.h./30 q.h.); Social Psychology (20 s.h./30 q.h.); and Sociology (20 s.h./30 q.h.). The committee still has not seen the complete list of all requirements that will go into effect January 1, 1972, so it is difficult to comment on the whole package. The attempt seems to be to require more hours of subject matter before teachers are certified in a particular area, which appears to be a step in the right direction. But there are still those troublesome questions of quantity vs. quality or both that remain unanswered.

The committee will make an effort to analyze the new standards in the coming year. Meanwhile, the committee has turned its attention to other matters which seem, especially in view of today's surplus of historians and tight budgets, particularly appropriate. The question has arisen as to whether the Standards Committee, with Academy backing, should broaden its scope in the quest for improved teaching of history to embrace a wider, yet clearly related, set of issues. More specifically, the Committee has been presented with two proposals:

1. That the Academy undertake some degree of responsibility for maintaining minimal standards of competence in the teaching of history on the high school and college level. Such responsibility could include, but not be limited to, the following: (1) guidelines for courses in the teaching of history on the high school level by the history department; (2) guidelines for courses on the teaching of history at the collegiate level (for M.A. and Ph.D. departments); (3) setting forth guidelines for the preparation of high school teachers and college instructors so that they can perform effectively in the classroom; (4) certification by the Academy of adequate standards in member schools.

2. That the Academy take some active interest in promoting history institutes (lasting a week or more) or workshops (usually weekend affairs) dealing with improving the teaching of history, or both. Some institutes—modeled after the NDEA and EDPA institutes—would be for high school teachers, while others would be for college instructors. Or there could be a mixed institute, depending upon the specific objectives desired. For example, an institute with a specific orientation within the general context of improving the teaching of history, might be one for the college instructor who has a preponderance of future high school teachers in his survey classes. How might he better teach his courses so that they, his students, will do a better job when they get out?

The Standards Committee invites the comments of the membership on these two proposals. Does the membership want the Standards Committee to broaden its activities to the College and University arena? And if it does, what portions of the two proposals above might be especially useful? Are there other areas, concerning secondary school or college standards that you feel the Standards Committee should concern itself with? Your reactions are solicited. Please contact either Michael Moore, Department of History, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43402, or Robert H. Jones, Department of History, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106.

Robert H. Jones, Chairman
Michael Moore
Ohio Academy of History
Committees, 1971-72

1. Executive Council
   Ex-officio:
   George W. Knepper (Akron), President
   Erving Beauregard (Dayton), Vice President
   Carl Klopfenstein (Heidelberg), Secretary-Treasurer
   Richard W. Smith (Ohio Wesleyan), Former President

   Elected:
   G. Wallace Chessman (Denison), 1970-72
   Eugene Murdock (Marietta), 1970-73
   Emily Geer (Findlay), 1971-74

2. Nominating Committee
   Charles Morley (Ohio State), Chairman
   Robert Bader (Mt. Union)
   George Lobdell (Ohio University)

3. Program Committee
   John Carrigg (Steuenville), Chairman
   James Hodges (Wooster)
   Zane Miller (Cincinnati)
   James Chastain (Ohio University)
   Roger Manning (Cleveland State)

4. Distinguished Service Award Committee
   Lawrence Kaplan (Kent State), Chairman
   Marian Siney (Case-Western Reserve)
   David Behen (Youngstown)

5. Publication Award Committee
   Bernard Sternsher (Bowling Green), Chairman
   Kimon Giocarinis (Hiram)
   James Richardson (Akron)
   William Kenney III (Kent State)
   Themistocles Rodis (Baldwin-Wallace)

6. Membership Committee
   Charles De Benedetti (Toledo), Chairman
   Mary K. Howard (John Carroll)
   Robert Kragalott (Ohio Wesleyan)
   Vladimir Seffel (OSU-Marion)

7. Standards Committee
   Robert H. Jones (Akron), 1970-73, Chairman
   Joseph Dubbert (Muskingum), 1970-73
   Harry Stevens (Ohio University), 1968-72
   Harris Dante (Kent State), 1968-72
   Michael Moore (Bowling Green), 1969-72
   Oscar Darlington (Ohio Northern), 1969-72

8. Historical Society and Archives
   Jacob Dorn (Wright State), 1970-73, Chairman
   Richard Haupt (Cincinnati Historical Society), 1970-73
   Dwight Smith (Miami), 1971-74
   Wilhelmina Robinson (Central State), 1971-74
   David Larson (Ohio Historical Society), 1969-72
   John Nethers (Ashland), 1969-72

9. Bicentennial of The American Revolution
   John Cary (Cleveland State), Chairman
   Don Gerlach (Akron)
   Richard Jellison (Miami)
   Carl Ubbelohde (Case-Western Reserve)
   Lee Benish (Xavier)
   David Skaggs (Bowling Green)

10. Fortieth Anniversary Committee
    Carl G. Gustavson (Ohio University), Chairman
    Harris Warren (Miami)
    Sydney Fisher (Ohio State)
    Raymond Bixler (Ashland)
    Paul Miller (Hiram)
    H. Landon Warner (Kenyon)

11. Editor of The Newsletter
    Kenneth Davison (Heidelberg)

Publications and Research Projects

FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER has retired after forty-seven years of teaching at Ohio State University but is writing two continuing volumes in the History of Ohio State University, dealing with the Fawcett years. His recent publications include, "William Oxley Thompson: Clergyman and Educator" in the Journal of Presbyterian History, Vol. I, No. 1 (Spring 1971), and "God and Man in a Secular City: The Church in Virginia City, Nevada," Nevada Historical Society Quarterly, XIV, No. 2 (Summer 1971).

ARVEL B. ERICKSON of Case Western Reserve University is co-author of an article "The Yelverton Case: Civil Legislation and Marriage" that appeared in March 1971 issue of Victorian Studies. He is also co-author, with W. D. Jones of the University of Georgia, of a book, The Pelouses, 1846-1857, published by Ohio State University Press.

JEROME MUSHKAT, The University of Akron, has published his study, Tammanyism: The Evolution of a Political Machine, 1789-1865, with Syracuse University Press. His article "Epithets for an Era: The Political Obituaries of Mordecai Noah" appeared in the summer issue of the New-York Historical Society Quarterly. He is at work on several manuscripts, including "The Impact of Urbanization on Nineteenth Century New York City" and a biography of Fernando Wood.

KERMIT J. PIKE is the author of A Guide to the Manuscripts and Archives of the Western Reserve Historical Society published by the Press of Case Western Reserve University.
Winners of Ohio Academy of History Annual Historical Achievement Awards (1946-1970)

1946—Dulles, Foster Rhea (Ohio State), China and America: The Story of their Relations since 1784.
1948—Robinson, Howard (Oberlin), The British Post Office, a History.
1950—Wittke, Carl (Western Reserve), The Utopian Communist: A Biography of Wilhelm Weitling: Nineteenth Century Reformer.
1951—No award.
1952—Wittke, Carl (Western Reserve), Refugees of Revolution: the German Forty-eighters in America.
1953—Arzt, Frederick B. (Oberlin), The Mind of the Middle Ages, A.D. 200-1500.
1954—Grimm, Harold J. (Ohio State), The Reformation Era, 1500-1650.
1955—Gustavson, Carl G. (Ohio University), Preface to History.
1956—Bremer, Robert H. (Ohio State), From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in the United States.
1959—Warner, Hoyt Landon (Kenyon), The Life of Mr. Justice Clarke: A Testament to the Power of Liberal Dissent in America.

1962—Goldberg, Harvey (Ohio State), The Life of Jean Jaures.
1963—Greene, Jack P. (Western Reserve), The Quest for Power: The Lower House of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776.
1964—Warner, Hoyt Landon (Kenyon), Progressivism in Ohio, 1897-1917.
1968—Marchman, W. B. (R. B. Hayes Library), For Distinguished Service.
1970—Marcus, Jacob (Hebrew Union), The Colonial American Jew, 1492-1776.
1971—To be awarded at April 22, 1972, annual meeting.

Notice of Annual Spring Meeting
April 22, 1972
THE SHEARATON INN
(Junction Interstate 71 and Route 161)
Columbus-Worthington, Ohio